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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the effects of a trusted relay node on the secrecy of the broadcast channel by
considering the model of relay broadcast channel with confidential messages (RBC-CM). Inner and outer bounds on
the capacity-equivocation region of the RBC-CM are provided, and the capacity results are further explained via a
degraded Gaussian example, which we call the degraded Gaussian relay broadcast channel with one common and
one confidential messages. Numerical results show that this trusted relay node helps to enhance the security of the
Gaussian broadcast channel with one common and one confidential messages.
Index Terms
Capacity-equivocation region, confidential messages, relay broadcast channel, secrecy capacity region.
I. INTRODUCTION
The secure communication over broadcast channel was first studied by Wyner [1], where a transmitter wished
to send a confidential message to a legitimate receiver through a broadcast channel, while he wished to keep
a wiretapper as ignorant of the message as possible. This model is called the wiretap channel. Measuring the
wiretapper’s uncertainty about the confidential message by equivocation, Wyner [1] determined the capacity-
equivocation region of the discrete memoryless wiretap channel. Based on Wyner’s work, Leung-Yan-Cheong and
Hellman [2] determined the capacity-equivocation region of the Gaussian wiretap channel. Wyner’s work was
generalized by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [3], where common and confidential messages were sent through the broadcast
channel. The common message was assumed to be decoded correctly by both the legitimate receiver and the
wiretapper, while the confidential message was only allowed to be obtained by the legitimate receiver. This model
is called the broadcast channel with confidential messages (BCC). The capacity-equivocation region of the discrete
memoryless BCC was determined in [3], and the capacity-equivocation region of the Gaussian BCC was determined
in [4]. By using the approach of [1] and [3], Liu et al. [5] studied the broadcast channel with two confidential
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2messages (no common message), and Xu et al. [6] studied the broadcast channel with two confidential messages
and one common message. Both of them provided inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation regions.
Due to the open nature of the wireless media, the wireless communication is susceptible to eavesdropping.
Recently, the security of the wireless networks receives a lot attention. For the multiple-access channel (MAC),
Liang and Poor [12] studied the MAC with confidential messages, where the degraded version of the MAC output is
available at the transmitters. Each transmitter treats the other one as a wiretapper, and wishes to keep its confidential
message as secret as possible from the wiretapper. Inner and outer bounds on capacity-equivocation region is
provided for this model, and the results are further explained via a Gaussian example. Other related works on
the MAC with secrecy constraint are in [13], [14], [15]. For the interference channel, Liu et al. [5] studied the
interference channel with two confidential messages, and provided inner and outer bounds on the secrecy capacity
region. Liang et al. studied the cognitive interference channel with one common message and one confidential
message [16], and Zaidi et al. investigated the secure communication over the multi-input multi-output (MIMO)
X-channel with asymmetric output feedback and delayed CSI at the transmitters [17]. For the relay channel, Lai and
El Gamal [18] studied the effects of an additional trusted relay node on the secrecy of the wiretap channel, where
a source wished to send messages to a destination while leveraging the help of a trusted relay node to hide those
messages from the wiretapper. Three inner bounds (with respect to decode-and-forward (DF), noise-and-forward
(NF) and compress-and-forward (CF) strategies) and one outer bound on the capacity-equivocation region were
provided in [18]. Of particular interest is the NF strategy, where the relay node sends codewords independent of the
message to confuse the wiretapper. Lai and El Gamal [18] showed that this NF strategy significantly improved the
secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel. Based on the work of [18], Tang et. al. [19] improved Lai and El Gamal’s
NF strategy by considering an additional case that both the legitimate receiver and the wiretapper could not decode
the relay codeword, and in this case, the relay codeword was served as interference for both the legitimate receiver
and the wiretapper. Other related works in the relay channel with secrecy constraint include Oohama’s relay channel
with confidential messages [20], where an un-trusted relay helps the transmission of messages from one sender to
one receiver, and Awan et al.’s secure communication over the parallel relay channel [21]. Recently, Ekrem and
Ulukus [22] investigated the effects of user cooperation on the secrecy of broadcast channels by considering a
cooperative relay broadcast channel. They showed that user cooperation can increase the achievable secrecy rate
region of [5].
In cellular and WiFi data networks, security is a critical issue when people wish to transmit important/private
information, such as credit card transactions or banking related data communications. Another important issue in
cellular and WiFi data networks is that the mobile users have been demanding increasingly higher down-link data
rate. Combining these two issues, how to achieve higher down-link secrecy data rate motivates us to study the
down-link or broadcast channel that exploits the techniques of relaying and user cooperation to achieve higher
secrecy rate. In this paper, we study the model of relay broadcast channel with confidential messages (RBC-CM),
see Figure 1. We want to know whether the secrecy capacity region of the broadcast channel can be enhanced by
using a trusted relay node.
3Fig. 1: Relay broadcast channels with confidential messages
Inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation region of the model of Figure 1 are provided. The inner
bounds are constructed according to the decode-and-forward (DF) and noise-and-forward (NF) strategies. Here note
that in [18], Lai and El Gamal has already shown that the compress-and-forward (CF) strategy is a combination of
the NF strategy and the classical Cover-El Gamal’s CF strategy [10], and it performs no better than the NF strategy.
Therefore, the CF inner bound on the capacity-equivocation region of Figure 1 is not considered in this paper. The
capacity results of the model of Figure 1 are further explained via a degraded Gaussian example, which we call
the degraded Gaussian relay broadcast channel with one common and one confidential messages. The numerical
results show that a trusted relay node helps to enhance the security of the Gaussian BCC [4].
In this paper, random variab1es, sample values and alphabets are denoted by capital letters, lower case letters and
calligraphic letters, respectively. A similar convention is applied to the random vectors and their sample values. For
example, UN denotes a random N -vector (U1, ..., UN ), and uN = (u1, ..., uN ) is a specific vector value in UN that
is the N th Cartesian power of U . UNi denotes a random N − i+ 1-vector (Ui, ..., UN ), and uNi = (ui, ..., uN ) is
a specific vector value in UNi . Let pV (v) denote the probability mass function Pr{V = v}. Throughout the paper,
the logarithmic function is to the base 2.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section II provides the inner and outer bounds on the capacity-
equivocation region of the model of Figure 1. The capacity results in Section II are further explained via a degraded
Gaussian example, which is shown in Section III. Final conclusions are in Section IV.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND THE MAIN RESULTS
The model of Figure 1 is a four-terminal discrete channel consisting of finite sets X , X1, Y , Y1, Z and a transition
probability distribution pY,Y1,Z|X1,X(y, y1, z|x1, x). XN and XN1 are the channel inputs from the transmitter and
the relay respectively, while Y N , Y N1 , Z
N are the channel outputs at receiver 1, relay and receiver 2, respectively.
The channel is discrete memoryless, i.e., the channel outputs (yi, y1,i, zi) at time i only depend on the channel
inputs (xi, x1,i) at time i.
Definition 1: (Channel encoder) The confidential messages W1 and W2 take values in W1, W2, respectively.
The common message W0 takes values inW0. W1, W2 and W0 are independent and uniformly distributed over their
4ranges. The channel encoder is a stochastic encoder fE that maps the messages w1, w2 and w0 into a codeword
xN ∈ XN . The transmission rates of the confidential messages (W1, W2) and the common message (W0) are
log ‖W1‖
N ,
log ‖W2‖
N and
log ‖W0‖
N , respectively.
Definition 2: (Relay encoder) The relay encoder is also a stochastic encoder ϕi that maps the signals (y1,1, y1,2, ..., y1,i−1)
received before time i to the channel input x1,i.
Definition 3: (Decoder) The decoder for receiver 1 is a mapping fD1 : YN → W0 ×W1, with input Y N and
outputs W˘0, W˘1. Let Pe1 be the error probability of receiver 1, and it is defined as Pr{(W0,W1) 6= (W˘0, W˘1)}.
The decoder for receiver 2 is a mapping fD2 : ZN →W0 ×W2, with input ZN and outputs Ŵ0, Ŵ2. Let Pe2
be the error probability of receiver 2, and it is defined as Pr{(W0,W2) 6= (Ŵ0, Ŵ2)}.
The equivocation rate at receiver 2 is defined as
∆1 =
1
N
H(W1|ZN ). (2.1)
Analogously, the equivocation rate at receiver 1 is defined as
∆2 =
1
N
H(W2|Y N ). (2.2)
A rate quintuple (R0, R1, R2, Re1, Re2) (where R0, R1, R2, Re1, Re2 > 0) is called achievable if, for any
 > 0 (where  is an arbitrary small positive real number and  → 0), there exists a channel encoder-decoder
(N,∆1,∆2, Pe1, Pe2) such that
lim
N→∞
log ‖ W0 ‖
N
= R0, lim
N→∞
log ‖ W1 ‖
N
= R1, lim
N→∞
log ‖ W2 ‖
N
= R2,
lim
N→∞
∆1 ≥ Re1, lim
N→∞
∆2 ≥ Re2, Pe1 ≤ , Pe2 ≤ . (2.3)
The capacity-equivocation region R(A) is a set composed of all achievable (R0, R1, R2, Re1, Re2) quintuples.
The inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation region R(A) are provided from Theorem 1 to Theorem
3, and they are proved in Appendix A, Appendix B and Appendix C, respectively. Our first result establishes an
outer-bound on the capacity-equivocation region of the model of Figure 1.
Theorem 1: (Outer bound) A single-letter characterization of the region R(Ao) (R(A) ⊆ R(Ao)) is as follows,
R(Ao) = {(R0, R1, R2, Re1, Re2) : Re1 ≤ R1, Re2 ≤ R2,
R0 ≤ min{I(U,U1;Y ), I(U ;Y, Y1|U1)},
R0 ≤ min{I(U,U2;Z), I(U ;Z, Y1|U2)},
R0 +R1 ≤ min{I(U,U1, V1;Y ), I(U, V1;Y, Y1|U1)},
R0 +R2 ≤ min{I(U,U2, V2;Z), I(U, V2;Z, Y1|U2)},
R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ I(U,U2, V1;Y, Y1|U1) + I(V2;Z, Y1|U,U1, U2, V1),
R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ I(U,U1, V2;Z, Y1|U2) + I(V1;Y, Y1|U,U1, U2, V2),
Re1 ≤ min{I(V1;Y |U, V2)− I(V1;Z|U, V2), I(V1;Y |U)− I(V1;Z|U)},
Re2 ≤ min{I(V2;Z|U, V1)− I(V2;Y |U, V1), I(V2;Z|U)− I(V2;Y |U)}},
5where U → (U1, U2, V1, V2)→ (X,X1)→ (Y, Y1, Z). Moreover, note that the outer bound on the secrecy capacity
region of Figure 1 is the set of triples (R0, R1, R2) such that (R0, R1, R2, Re1 = R1, Re2 = R2) ∈ R(Ao).
Proof:
The auxiliary random variables in R(Ao) are defined by
U1 , Y J−11 , U2 , Y N1,J+1, U , (Y J−1,W0, ZNJ+1, J)
V1 , (U,W1), V2 , (U,W2), Y , YJ , Y1 , Y1,J , Z , ZJ , (2.4)
where J is a random variable (uniformly distributed over {1, 2, , ..., N}), and it is independent of XN , XN1 , Y N ,
Y N1 , Z
N , W0, W1 and W2. From the above definitions, it is easy to see that the relay X1 is represented by two
auxiliary random variables U1 and U2. The common message W0 is represented by U , and the confidential messages
W1, W2 are represented by V1 and V2, respectively. The proof of Theorem 1 combines Csisza´r-Ko¨rner’s equality
[3] for the equivocation analysis, Nair-El Gamal’s technique [9] for the bounds on the sum rate R0 + R1 + R2,
and Cover-El Gamal’s technique [10] for introducing the relay input and output into the bounds on R0, R0 +R1,
R0 +R2 and R0 +R1 +R2. The details of the proof are in Appendix A.
Remark 1: There are some notes on Theorem 1, see the following.
• If we allow the input XN1 and output Y
N
1 of the relay to be constants, from the above definitions in (2.4), it is
easy to see that the auxiliary random variables U1, U2 and Y1 all are constants. Substituting U1 = U2 = Y1 =
const into the region R(Ao), we obtain an outer bound on the capacity-equivocation region of the broadcast
channel with two confidential messages and one common message, and it is in accordance with the outer
bound in [6].
• Define a triple (R0, R1, R2) is achievable if, for any  > 0, there exists a channel encoder-decoder (N,Pe1, Pe2)
such that
lim
N→∞
log ‖ W0 ‖
N
= R0, lim
N→∞
log ‖ W1 ‖
N
= R1, lim
N→∞
log ‖ W2 ‖
N
= R2, Pe1 ≤ , Pe2 ≤ . (2.5)
The region Rrbc, which is composed of all achievable (R0, R1, R2) triples defined in (2.5), is the capacity
region of the general relay broadcast channel. To the best of our knowledge, there is no outer bound on Rrbc,
and the inner bounds on Rrbc are studied in [23]. However, we find that the region R(Ao) without the bounds
on Re1 and Re2 can be served as an outer bound on Rrbc, and this is because without the consideration of
the equivocation rates, our model reduces to the general relay broadcast channel.
We now turn our attention to constructing cooperation strategies for the model of Figure 1. Our first step is to
characterize the inner bound on the capacity-equivocation region by using Cover-El Gamal’s Decode and Forward
(DF) strategy [10]. In our DF strategy, the relay node will first decode the common message, and then re-encode
the common message to cooperate with the transmitter. The superposition coding and random binning techniques
used in [6] will be combined with the DF cooperation strategy to characterize the inner bound. Note that the DF
inner bound of [18] is obtained by allowing the relay to decode both the confidential and common messages. In
6general, for these two DF strategies, we do not know which one is better. In Section III, we show that for the
degraded Gaussian relay-eavesdropper 1 channel, in some particular cases, our DF strategy performs better than
that of [18].
Theorem 2: (Inner bound 1: DF strategy) A single-letter characterization of the region R(Ai1) (R(Ai1) ⊆ R(A))
is as follows,
R(Ai1) = {(R0, R1, R2, Re1, Re2) : Re1 ≤ R1, Re2 ≤ R2,
R0 ≤ min{I(U ;Y1|X1), I(U,X1;Y ), I(U,X1;Z)},
R0 +R1 ≤ min{I(U ;Y1|X1), I(U,X1;Y ), I(U,X1;Z)}+ I(V1;Y |U,X1),
R0 +R2 ≤ min{I(U ;Y1|X1), I(U,X1;Y ), I(U,X1;Z)}+ I(V2;Z|U,X1),
R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ min{I(U ;Y1|X1), I(U,X1;Y ), I(U,X1;Z)}+ I(V1;Y |U,X1) + I(V2;Z|U,X1)− I(V1;V2|U,X1),
Re1 ≤ I(V1;Y |U,X1)− I(V1;V2|U,X1)− I(V1;Z|U,X1, V2),
Re2 ≤ I(V2;Z|U,X1)− I(V1;V2|U,X1)− I(V2;Y |U,X1, V1)},
for some distribution
PY,Z,Y1,X,X1,V1,V2,U (y, z, y1, x, x1, v1, v2, u) = PY,Z,Y1|X,X1(y, z, y1|x, x1)PX,X1|U,V1,V2(x, x1|u, v1, v2)PU,V1,V2(u, v1, v2).
Moreover, note that the DF inner bound on the secrecy capacity region of Figure 1 is the set of triples (R0, R1, R2)
such that (R0, R1, R2, Re1 = R1, Re2 = R2) ∈ R(Ai1).
Proof:
The coding scheme of RAi1 combines Cover-El Gamal’s decode-and-forward (DF) strategy and block Markov
coding scheme for the relay channel [10], Marton’s double binning and superposition coding techniques for
the general broadcast channel [11], and Csisza´r-Ko¨rner’s random binning technique for the BCC [3]. The total
transmission is formed by B blocks, in which B − 1 messages will be sent. The coding structure for block b
(2 ≤ b ≤ B) is depicted in the following Figure 2. In Figure 2, at block b, the new confidential messages
(w1,b, w2,b) are first split into four sub-messages (w10,b, w11,b, w20,b, w22,b), where w10,b and w20,b are common
messages decoded by both receivers, and w11,b and w22,b are confidential messages for receiver 1 and receiver 2,
respectively. Define w∗0,b = (w0,b, w10,b, w20,b). For block b, the relay sends x
N
1 (wr,b), where wr,b is a deterministic
function of w∗0,b−1. The codeword u
N represents the superposition code in which the new common message w∗0,b is
superimposed on the relay message wr,b. The codeword vN1 (or v
N
2 ) represents the superposition code in which the
private message w11,b (or w22,b) is superimposed on w∗0,b and wr,b. The input of the channel x
N is i.i.d. generated
according to PX|U,V1,V2,X1(x|u, v1, v2, x1). The details of the proof are in Appendix B.
1Here “eavesdropper” is another name for “wiretapper”
7Fig. 2: The encoder structure of the DF strategy in block b (2 ≤ b ≤ B)
The second step is to characterize the inner bound on the capacity-equivocation region by using the generalized
noise and forward (GNF) strategy. In the GNF strategy, the relay node does not attempt to decode the messages but
sends codewords that are independent of the transmitters messages, and these codewords aid in confusing the less
capable receiver. Specifically, if the channel from the relay to receiver 1 is more capable than the channel from the
relay to receiver 2, only receiver 1 is allowed to decode the relay codeword, and vice versa. Here note that the NF
strategies of [18] and [19] only consider the case that there is no confidential message for the receiver 2, and thus
confusing receiver 1 is not needed, i.e., if the channel from the relay to receiver 2 is more capable than the channel
from the relay to receiver 1, we allow both or none of the receivers to decode the relay codeword. It is easy to see
that our GNF strategy is a generalization of the NF strategies [18], [19] for the single confidential message case.
Theorem 3: (Inner bound 2: GNF strategy) A single-letter characterization of the region R(Ai2) (R(Ai2) ⊆
R(A)) is as follows,
R(Ai2) = convex closure of (L1
⋃
L2)
where L1 is given by
L1 =
⋃
PY,Z,Y1,X,X1,V1,V2,U
:
I(X1;Y ) > I(X1;Z|U, V2)

(R0, R1, R2, Re1, Re2) : Re1 ≤ R1, Re2 ≤ R2,
R0 ≤ min{I(U ;Y |X1), I(U ;Z)},
R0 +R1 ≤ min{I(U ;Y |X1), I(U ;Z)}+ I(V1;Y |U,X1),
R0 +R2 ≤ min{I(U ;Y |X1), I(U ;Z)}+ I(V2;Z|U),
R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ min{I(U ;Y |X1), I(U ;Z)}
+I(V1;Y |U,X1) + I(V2;Z|U)− I(V1;V2|U),
Re1 ≤ min{I(X1;Z|U, V1, V2), I(X1;Y )}+ I(V1;Y |U,X1)
−I(V1;V2|U)− I(X1, V1;Z|U, V2),
Re2 ≤ I(V2;Z|U)− I(V1;V2|U)− I(V2;Y |U,X1, V1).

,
8L2 is given by
L2 =
⋃
PY,Z,Y1,X,X1,V1,V2,U
:
I(X1;Z) > I(X1;Y |U, V1)

(R0, R1, R2, Re1, Re2) : Re1 ≤ R1, Re2 ≤ R2,
R0 ≤ min{I(U ;Z|X1), I(U ;Y )},
R0 +R1 ≤ min{I(U ;Z|X1), I(U ;Y )}+ I(V1;Y |U),
R0 +R2 ≤ min{I(U ;Z|X1), I(U ;Y )}+ I(V2;Z|U,X1),
R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ min{I(U ;Z|X1), I(U ;Y )}
+I(V1;Y |U) + I(V2;Z|U,X1)− I(V1;V2|U),
Re1 ≤ I(V1;Y |U)− I(V1;V2|U)− I(V1;Z|U, V2, X1),
Re2 ≤ min{I(X1;Y |U, V1, V2), I(X1;Z)}+ I(V2;Z|U,X1)
−I(V1;V2|U)− I(X1, V2;Y |U, V1).

,
and PY,Z,Y1,X,X1,V1,V2,U (y, z, y1, x, x1, v1, v2, u) satisfies
PY,Z,Y1,X,X1,V1,V2,U (y, z, y1, x, x1, v1, v2, u) = PY,Z,Y1|X,X1(y, z, y1|x, x1)PX|U,V1,V2(x|u, v1, v2)PU,V1,V2(u, v1, v2)PX1(x1).
Moreover, note that the GNF inner bound on the secrecy capacity region of Figure 1 is the set of triples (R0, R1, R2)
such that (R0, R1, R2, Re1 = R1, Re2 = R2) ∈ R(Ai2).
Proof:
The region L1 is characterized under the condition that the channel from the relay to receiver 1 is more capable
than the channel from the relay to receiver 2 (here note that I(X1;Y ) > I(X1;Z|U, V2) and X1 is independent of
U , V2 imply that I(X1;Y ) > I(X1;Z)). Then, in this case, receiver 1 is allowed to decode the relay codeword, and
receiver 2 is not allowed to decode it. The rate of the relay is defined as min{I(X1;Z|U, V1, V2), I(X1;Y )}, and
the relay codeword is viewed as pure noise for receiver 2. Analogously, the region L2 is characterized under the
condition that the channel from the relay to receiver 2 is more capable than the channel from the relay to receiver
1. Then, in this case, receiver 2 is allowed to decode the relay codeword, and receiver 1 is not allowed to decode
it. In this case, the relay codeword is viewed as pure noise for receiver 1. Combining the proof of [18, Theorem 3]
with the double binning technique of the broadcast channel with one common and two confidential messages [6],
the achievable regions L1 and L2 are obtained. The details of the proof are in Appendix C.
III. DEGRADED RELAY BROADCAST CHANNEL WITH ONE COMMON AND ONE CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGES
In this section, the capacity results on the discrete memoryless degraded relay broadcast channel with one common
and one confidential messages are provided in Subsection III-A, the capacity results on the degraded Gaussian case
are shown in Subsection III-B, the numerical results are in Subsection III-C, and the comparison of our proposed
relay strategies and previous known strategies is shown in Subsection III-D.
A. Discrete memoryless degraded relay broadcast channel with one common and one confidential messages
The degraded relay broadcast channel with one common and one confidential messages is a special case of the
model of Figure 1. and it implies the existence of a Markov chain X → (X1, Y1) → Y → Z. Since the received
9symbols ZN of receiver 2 are degraded versions of those of receiver 1, there is no confidential message W2. The
channel encoder is a stochastic encoder that maps the messages w0 and w1 into a codeword xN ∈ XN . Moreover,
the decoder for receiver 1 is a mapping fD1 : YN →W0 ×W1, with input Y N and outputs Wˇ0 and Wˇ1. Let Pe1
be the error probability of receiver 1, and it is defined as Pr{(Wˇ0, Wˇ1) 6= (W0,W1)}. Analogously, the decoder
for receiver 2 is a mapping fD2 : ZN → W0, with input ZN and output Wˆ0. Let Pe2 be the error probability of
receiver 2, and it is defined as Pr{Wˆ0 6= W0}.
A rate triple (R0, R1, Re) (where R0, R1, Re > 0) is called achievable if, for any  > 0 (where  is an arbitrary
small positive real number and → 0), there exists a channel encoder-decoder (N,∆, Pe1, Pe2) such that
lim
N→∞
log ‖ W0 ‖
N
= R0, lim
N→∞
log ‖ W1 ‖
N
= R1,
lim
N→∞
∆ ≥ Re, Pe1 ≤ , Pe2 ≤ . (3.6)
The capacity-equivocation region R(C) is a set composed of all achievable (R0, R1, Re) triples. The inner and
outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation region R(C) are provided from Theorem 4 to Theorem 6, see the
remainder of this subsection. The first result is an outer bound on the capacity-equivocation region R(C).
Theorem 4: (Outer bound) A single-letter characterization of the region R(Co) (R(C) ⊆ R(Co)) is as follows,
R(Co) = {(R0, R1, Re) : Re ≤ R1,
R0 ≤ min{I(U,Q;Z), I(U ;Y1|Q)},
R0 +R1 ≤ min{I(Q,U, V ;Y ), I(U, V ;Y1|Q)},
Re ≤ min{I(V ;Y1|U,Q)− I(V ;Z|U,Q), I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U)}},
where (Q,U, V,X)→ (X1, Y1)→ Y → Z. Here note that the outer bound on the secrecy capacity region of R(C)
is the set of pairs (R0, R1) such that (R0, R1, Re = R1) ∈ R(Co)
Proof:
See Appendix D.
Remark 2: There are some notes on Theorem 4, see the following.
• In fact, we can directly obtain an outer bound R(Co∗) on R(C) by substituting V2 = U (here V2 = U is from
the definition that V2 = (U,W2) and W2 = const) and R2 = Re2 = 0 into Theorem 1, and R(Co∗) is given
by
R(Co∗) = {(R0, R1, Re) : Re ≤ R1,
R0 ≤ min{I(U,U1;Y ), I(U ;Y, Y1|U1)},
R0 ≤ min{I(U,U2;Z), I(U ;Z, Y1|U2)},
R0 +R1 ≤ min{I(U,U1, V ;Y ), I(U, V ;Y, Y1|U1)},
R0 +R1 ≤ I(U,U2, V ;Y, Y1|U1),
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R0 +R1 ≤ I(U,U1;Z, Y1|U2) + I(V ;Y, Y1|U,U1, U2),
Re ≤ I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U)},
where V and Re represent V1 and Re1 of Theorem 1, respectively. However, we find that a tighter outer bound
may be obtained by using the degradedness assumption X → (X1, Y1) → Y → Z. Specifically, in R(Co∗),
with the help of the degradedness assumption, we can remove the auxiliary random variable U2, simplify
the bounds on R0 and R0 + R1, and obtain a new upper bound Re ≤ I(V ;Y1|U,Q) − I(V ;Z|U,Q) (here
Q = U1) on the equivocation Re. Since the equivocation Re of R(Co) satisfies Re ≤ min{I(V ;Y1|U,Q) −
I(V ;Z|U,Q), I(V ;Y |U) − I(V ;Z|U)} ≤ I(V ;Y |U) − I(V ;Z|U), it is easy to see that the equivocation
bound of R(Co) is tighter than that of R(Co∗).
• Letting R0 = 0 and Re = R1, and observing that I(V ;Y |U)−I(V ;Z|U) ≤ I(Q,U, V ;Y ) and I(V ;Y1|U,Q)−
I(V ;Z|U,Q) ≤ I(U, V ;Y1|Q), an outer bound CCos on the secrecy capacity CCs of the discrete memoryless
degraded relay broadcast channel with one common and one confidential messages is given by
CCos = max
PQUVXX1Y1
min{I(V ;Y1|U,Q)− I(V ;Z|U,Q), I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U)}.
Note that the degraded relay broadcast channel with one common and one confidential messages reduces to the
degraded relay-eavesdropper channel [18] when there is no common message (R0 = 0). We also notice that in
[18, Theorem 5], the secrecy capacity of a kind of physically degraded relay-eavesdropper channel has been
determined. However, we find that the degradedness assumption of [18, Theorem 5] is (X,X1) → Y1 → Y ,
which is different from that of this paper. The secrecy capacity of the degraded relay-eavesdropper channel
(with the degradedness assumption X → (X1, Y1)→ Y ) is still unknown.
Now we turn to the inner bounds on the capacity-equivocation region R(C). The following Theorem 5 and
Theorem 6 provide the decode-and-forward (DF) and noise-and-forward (NF) inner bounds on R(C), respectively.
Theorem 5: (Inner bound 1: DF strategy) A single-letter characterization of the region R(Ci1) (R(Ci1) ⊆ R(C))
is as follows,
R(Ci1) = {(R0, R1, Re) : Re ≤ R1,
R0 ≤ min{I(U ;Y1|X1), I(U,X1;Z)},
R0 +R1 ≤ min{I(U ;Y1|X1), I(U,X1;Z)}+ I(V ;Y |U,X1),
Re ≤ I(V ;Y |U,X1)− I(V ;Z|U,X1),
for some distribution
PY,Z,Y1,X,X1,V,U (y, z, y1, x, x1, v, u) = PZ|Y (z|y)PY |X1,Y1(y|x1, y1)PY1|X,X1(y1|x, x1)PX,X1,U,V (x, x1, u, v).
Note that the DF inner bound on the secrecy capacity region is denoted as CCi1s , which is the set of pairs (R0, R1)
such that (R0, R1, Re = R1) ∈ R(Ci1).
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Proof: By letting V2 = const, V1 = V and using the Markov chain (U, V ) → (X1, Y1) → Y → Z, the DF
inner bound on R(C) is directly obtained from Theorem 2. Thus, the proof is omitted here.
Remark 3: Letting R0 = 0 and Re = R1, the DF inner bound CCi1s on the secrecy capacity C
C
s is given by
CCi1s = max
PUVXX1
(I(V ;Y |U,X1)− I(V ;Z|U,X1)). (3.7)
Here note that CCi1s is obtained by allowing the relay to decode the common message which is represented by U ,
and the relay is not allowed to decode the confidential message represented by V . We notice that Lai and El Gamal
[18, Theorem 2] also presents an DF inner bound CCi∗s on the secrecy capacity of the relay-eavesdropper channel,
which can also be viewed as an DF inner bound on CCs , and it is given by
CCi1∗s = max
PXX1|V1V2PUV1V2
(min{I(V1, V2;Y |U), I(V1;Y1|V2, U)} − I(V1, V2;Z|U)). (3.8)
The bound CCi1∗s is obtained by allowing the relay to decode both the confidential message represented by V1
and the common message represented by U . In general, for these two bounds (CCi1s and C
Ci1∗
s ), we do not know
which one is larger. In Subsection III-D, we present a Gaussian example and show that in some particular cases,
CCi1s is larger than C
Ci1∗
s .
Theorem 6: (Inner bound 2: NF strategy) A single-letter characterization of the region R(Ci2) (R(Ci2) ⊆ R(C))
is as follows,
R(Ci2) = convex closure of (L3
⋃
L4)
where L3 is given by
L3 =
⋃
PY,Z,Y1,X,X1,V,U
:
I(X1;Y ) ≥ I(X1;Z|U)

(R0, R1, Re) : Re ≤ R1, R0 ≤ I(U ;Z),
R0 +R1 ≤ I(U ;Z) + I(V ;Y |U,X1),
Re ≤ min{I(X1;Z|U, V ), I(X1;Y )}+ I(V ;Y |U,X1)− I(X1, V ;Z|U)
 ,
L4 is given by
L4 =
⋃
PY,Z,Y1,X,X1,V,U
:
I(X1;Y ) < I(X1;Z|U)

(R0, R1, Re) : Re ≤ R1, R0 ≤ I(U ;Z|X1),
R0 +R1 ≤ I(U ;Z|X1) + I(V ;Y |U,X1),
Re ≤ I(V ;Y |U,X1)− I(V ;Z|U,X1)
 ,
and PY,Z,Y1,X,X1,V,U (y, z, y1, x, x1, v, u) satisfies
PY,Z,Y1,X,X1,V,U (y, z, y1, x, x1, v, u) = PZ|Y (z|y)PY |X1,Y1(y|x1, y1)PY1|X,X1(y1|x, x1)PX,U,V (x, u, v)PX1(x1).
Note that the NF inner bound on the secrecy capacity region is denoted as CCi2s , and it is the set of pairs (R0, R1)
such that (R0, R1, Re = R1) ∈ R(Ci2).
Proof:
• The region L3 implies that the rate of the relay is Rr = min{I(X1;Z|U, V ), I(X1;Y )} ≥ I(X1;Z), which
means that receiver 1 is able to decode the relay codeword xN1 , and receiver 2 can not decode it. Therefore,
in this case, xN1 can be viewed as a noise signal to confuse receiver 2. Letting V2 = const and V1 = V , and
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using the Markov chain X → (X1, Y1) → Y → Z, the region L3 is directly obtained from the region L1 of
Theorem 2. Thus, the detail of the proof is omitted here.
• For the region L4, the rate of the relay is Rr = I(X1;Z) ≤ I(X1;Y ), which implies that both the receivers can
decode the relay codeword xN1 , and in this case, x
N
1 serves as a common message decoded by both receivers.
Thus, the achievability proof of the region L4 is along the lines of the proof of the broadcast channel with
confidential messages [3], and we omit the proof here.
Remark 4: There are some notes on Theorem 6, see the following.
• The auxiliary random variable U of Theorem 6 represents the common message W0. Letting U = const and
Re = R1, Theorem 6 can be served as an achievable secrecy rate CCi2s for the general relay-eavesdropper
channel [18] (without the degradedness assumption), and it is given as follows.
– If I(X1;Y ) ≥ I(X1;Z), the achievable secrecy rate CCi2s satisfies
CCi2s = max
PX|V PV PX1
[I(V ;Y |X1) + min{I(X1;Y ), I(X1;Z|V )} − I(V,X1;Z)]. (3.9)
– If I(X1;Y ) < I(X1;Z), the achievable secrecy rate CCi2s satisfies
CCi2s = max
PX|V PV PX1
[I(V ;Y |X1)− I(V ;Z|X1)]. (3.10)
Here note that (3.9) and (3.10) can be combined as
CCi2s = max
PX|V PV PX1
[I(V ;Y |X1) + min{I(X1;Y ), I(X1;Z|V )}
− min{I(X1;Y ), I(X1;Z)} − I(V ;Z|X1)]. (3.11)
We also notice that Lai and El Gamal [18, Theorem 2] has already provided a NF achievable secrecy rate
CCi2∗s for the relay-eavesdropper channel, and it is also given by (3.11). Thus, we can conclude that our NF
achievable secrecy rate CCi2s is equivalent to Lai-El Gamal’s NF achievable secrecy rate C
Ci2∗
s .
• In [19, Theorem 1], Tang et al. provide a new NF achievable secrecy rate CCi2∗∗s for the relay-eavesdropper
channel, and it can be equivalently characterized by the following cases:
– Case 1: if I(X1;Y |X) ≤ I(X1;Z),
CCi2∗∗s = max{I(X;Y |X1)− I(X;Z|X1), I(X;Y )− I(X;Z)}. (3.12)
– Case 2: if I(X1;Y ) ≤ I(X1;Z) ≤ I(X1;Y |X) ≤ I(X1;Z|X),
CCi2∗∗s = max{I(X;Y |X1)− I(X;Z|X1), I(X;Y )− I(X;Z)}. (3.13)
– Case 3: if I(X1;Y ) ≤ I(X1;Z) ≤ I(X1;Z|X) ≤ I(X1;Y |X),
CCi2∗∗s = max{I(X;Y |X1)− I(X;Z|X1), I(X;Y )− I(X;Z)}. (3.14)
– Case 4: if I(X1;Z) ≤ I(X1;Y ) ≤ I(X1;Y |X) ≤ I(X1;Z|X),
CCi2∗∗s = max[I(X;Y )− I(X;Z)]. (3.15)
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– Case 5: if I(X1;Z) ≤ I(X1;Y ) ≤ I(X1;Z|X) ≤ I(X1;Y |X),
CCi2∗∗s = max[I(X,X1;Y )− I(X,X1;Z)]. (3.16)
– Case 6: if I(X1;Z|X) ≤ I(X1;Y ),
CCi2∗∗s = max[I(X;Y |X1)− I(X;Z)]. (3.17)
Comparing CCi2s , C
Ci2∗
s (replacing V by X) with C
Ci2∗∗
s , it is easy to see that the NF achievable secrecy
rates of this paper and [18, Theorem 2] are included in that of [19, Theorem 1], and the achievable secrecy
rate max[I(X;Y ) − I(X;Z)], which is not considered in [18] and this paper, is studied in [19, Theorem
1]. Specifically, in [19, Theorem 1], Tang et al. show that if we allow the relay to generate the “artificial
noise” with the rate Rr > min{I(X1;Y ), I(X1;Z)}, both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper can
not decode the relay codeword. The relay codeword is served as interference for both the legitimate receiver
and the eavesdropper, and thus Wyner’s secrecy rate [1] (max[I(X;Y )− I(X;Z)]) is also achievable for this
case. However, in Subsection III-D, we show that the achievable secrecy rates CCi2s , C
Ci2∗
s and C
Ci2∗∗
s are
the same for the Gaussian case.
• In [19], the NF achievable secrecy rate CCi2∗∗s for three special cases (weak interference/eavesdropping, strong
interference/eavesdropping and very strong eavesdropping) is studied. Comparing CCi2s (C
Ci2∗
s ) with C
Ci2∗∗
s
for these special cases, we have the following comments.
– For the weak interference/eavesdropping (which implies that I(X;Y |X1) ≥ I(X;Z|X1) and I(X1;Z|X) ≥
I(X1;Y |X)), CCi2∗∗s is given by
CCi2∗∗s = max max
 I(X;Y |X1)− I(X;Z|X1)I(X;Y )− I(X;Z)
 . (3.18)
As stated above, we have shown that CCi2s = C
Ci2∗
s . For the weak interference/eavesdropping, we have
CCi2s = C
Ci2∗
s = max[I(X;Y |X1)− I(X;Z|X1)]. (3.19)
Comparing (3.18) with (3.19), it is easy to see that CCi2s = C
Ci2∗
s ≤ CCi2∗∗s .
– For the strong interference/eavesdropping (which implies that I(X;Y |X1) ≤ I(X;Z|X1) and I(X1;Z|X) ≤
I(X1;Y |X)), CCi2∗∗s is given by
CCi2∗∗s = max
min
 I(X,X1;Y )− I(X,X1;Z)I(X;Y |X1)− I(X;Z)

+ . (3.20)
From (3.9), (3.10) and the definition of the strong interference/eavesdropping, we also have
CCi2s = C
Ci2∗
s = max
min
 I(X,X1;Y )− I(X,X1;Z)I(X;Y |X1)− I(X;Z)

+ . (3.21)
It is easy to see that CCi2s = C
Ci2∗
s = C
Ci2∗∗
s for the strong interference/eavesdropping.
– For the very strong interference/eavesdropping (which implies that I(X;Z) ≥ I(X;Y |X1)), it is easy to
see that CCi2s = C
Ci2∗
s = C
Ci2∗∗
s = 0.
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B. Degraded Gaussian relay broadcast channel with one common and one confidential messages
In this subsection, we investigate the bounds on the secrecy capacity region of the degraded Gaussian relay
broadcast channel with one common and one confidential messages. The signal received at each node is given by
Y1 = X + Zr, Y = X +X1 + Zr + Z1, Z = X +X1 + Zr + Z2, (3.22)
where Zr ∼ N (0, Nr), Z1 ∼ N (0, N1), Z2 ∼ N (0, N2), N2 > N1, and they are independent. The average power
constraints of XN and XN1 are
1
N
∑N
i=1E[X
2
i ] ≤ P1 and 1N
∑N
i=1E[X
2
1,i] ≤ P2, respectively. The secrecy capacity
region of this degraded Gaussian model is denoted by CCgs .
First, the DF inner bound on CCgs is given by
CCgi1s =
⋃
0≤α≤1

(R0, R1) :
R0 ≤ min{ 12 log P1+NrαP1+Nr , 12 log P1+P2+N2+NrαP1+N2+Nr }
R1 ≤ 12 log αP1+Nr+N1N1+Nr − 12 log αP1+Nr+N2N2+Nr
 . (3.23)
Proof: The region CCgi1s is obtained by substituting X = U + V , U = c1X1 + X10, (3.22) and Re = R1
into Theorem 5, where U ∼ N (0, (1 − α)P1), V ∼ N (0, αP1), X10 ∼ N (0, (1 − α)βP1) (0 ≤ β ≤ 1), and
c1 =
√
P1(1−α)(1−β)
P2
. Here note that X10 is independent of X1, and V is independent of U .
Second, the NF inner bound on CCgs is considered into the following two cases:
• Case 1: If N2 ≥ N1 + P1, the NF inner bound CCgi2s is given by
CCgi2s =
⋃
0≤α≤1

(R0, R1) :
R0 ≤ 12 log P1+P2+Nr+N2(1−α)P1+P2+Nr+N2
R0 +R1 ≤ 12 log P1+P2+Nr+N2(1−α)P1+P2+Nr+N2 + 12 log
(1−α)P1+Nr+N1
Nr+N1
R1 ≤ min{ 12 log Nr+N2+P2Nr+N2 , 12 log P1+P2+Nr+N1P1+Nr+N1 }
+ 12 log
(1−α)P1+Nr+N1
Nr+N1
− 12 log P2+Nr+N2Nr+N2

. (3.24)
Proof: The region (3.24) is obtained by substituting X = U + V , (3.22) and Re = R1 into L3, where
V ∼ N (0, (1− α)P1), U ∼ N (0, αP1), and X1, U and V are independent random variables. Here note that
P1 +N1 ≤ N2 implies that I(X1;Y ) ≥ I(X1;Z|U) for all 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. The proof is completed.
• Case 2: If N2 < N1 + P1, the NF inner bound CCgi2s is given by
CCgi2s = A
⋃
B, (3.25)
where A is given by
A =
⋃
0≤α≤N2−N1P1

(R0, R1) :
R0 ≤ 12 log P1+P2+Nr+N2(1−α)P1+P2+Nr+N2
R0 +R1 ≤ 12 log P1+P2+Nr+N2(1−α)P1+P2+Nr+N2 + 12 log
(1−α)P1+Nr+N1
Nr+N1
R1 ≤ min{ 12 log Nr+N2+P2Nr+N2 , 12 log P1+P2+Nr+N1P1+Nr+N1 }
+ 12 log
(1−α)P1+Nr+N1
Nr+N1
− 12 log P2+Nr+N2Nr+N2

, (3.26)
15
and B is given by
B =
⋃
N2−N1
P1
<α≤1

(R0, R1) :
R0 ≤ 12 log P1+Nr+N2(1−α)P1+Nr+N2
R0 +R1 ≤ 12 log P1+Nr+N2(1−α)P1+Nr+N2 + 12 log
(1−α)P1+Nr+N1
Nr+N1
R1 ≤ 12 log Nr+N1+(1−α)P1Nr+N1 − 12 log
Nr+N2+(1−α)P1
Nr+N2

. (3.27)
Proof: Note that N2 < N1 + P1 implies that I(X1;Y ) ≥ I(X1;Z|U) holds if 0 ≤ α ≤ N2−N1P1 , and
I(X1;Y ) < I(X1;Z|U) holds if N2−N1P1 < α ≤ 1. The region A is the same as that of case 1, and the region
B is obtained by substituting X = U + V , (3.22) and Re = R1 into L4. Thus, the proof is completed.
Third, the outer bound (CCgos ) on the secrecy capacity region CCgs is given by
CCgos =
⋃
0≤δ≤1

(R0, R1) :
R0 ≤ min{ 12 log P1+P2+Nr+N2δP1+Nr+N2 , 12 log P1+NrδP1+Nr }
R0 +R1 ≤ min{ 12 log P1+P2+Nr+N1Nr+N1 , 12 log P1+NrNr }
R1 ≤ min{ 12 log P1+P2+Nr+N1Nr+N1 − 12 log P1+P2+Nr+N2δP1+Nr+N2 , 12 log δP1+NrNr }

. (3.28)
Proof: First, note that h(X+X1 +Zr +Z2|U, V,Q) ≥ h(X+X1 +Zr +Z2|U, V,Q,X1, X) = h(Zr +Z2) =
1
2 log 2pie(Nr +N2), and h(X+X1 +Zr +Z2|U, V,Q) ≤ h(X+X1 +Zr +Z2) ≤ 12 log 2pie(Nr +N2 +P1 +P2),
thus we can conclude that
h(X +X1 + Zr + Z2|U, V,Q) = 1
2
log 2pie(Nr +N2 + α(P1 + P2)), (3.29)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Analogously, we have
h(X +X1 + Zr + Z2|U, V ) = 1
2
log 2pie(Nr +N2 + (α+ β − αβ)(P1 + P2)), (3.30)
h(X +X1 + Zr + Z2|U) = 1
2
log 2pie(Nr +N2 + (α+ β − αβ + γ − αγ − βγ + αβγ)(P1 + P2)), (3.31)
h(X + Zr|Q,U) = 1
2
log 2pie(Nr + δP1), (3.32)
where 0 ≤ β, γ, δ ≤ 1. Substituting (3.22) and Re = R1 into Theorem 4, using the above (3.29), (3.30), (3.31),
(3.32) and the entropy power inequality, and maximizing the parameters α, β and γ, we have the outer bound
(3.28). Here note that (3.28) is achieved if β = 0, γ = 1 and α = P1δP1+P2 . Thus, the proof is completed.
Finally, remember that [4] provides the secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian broadcast channel with one
confidential message and one common message (GBCC), and it is given by
CGBCCs =
⋃
0≤α≤1

(R0, R1) :
R0 ≤ 12 log P1+Nr+N2αP1+Nr+N2 ,
R1 ≤ 12 log αP1+Nr+N1N1+Nr − 12 log αP1+Nr+N2N2+Nr .
 . (3.33)
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C. Numerical Results on the Gaussian Example
The following Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the inner and outer bounds on CCgs and the secrecy capacity region
of the Gaussian BCC for several values of P1, P2, Nr, N1 and N2. Specifically, in Figure 3, we choose P1 = 5,
P2 = 20, N1 = 2, N2 = 8 and Nr = 2, which implies that N2 ≥ N1 + P1. For this case, the NF inner bound on
CCgs reduces to the region of case 1. Compared with the secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian BCC, it is easy
to see that the maximum secrecy rate R1 of CGBCCs is enhanced by using the NF strategy. For the DF strategy,
though it can not increase the maximum R1 of CGBCCs , the maximum common rate R0 and the entire secrecy
capacity region CGBCCs are enhanced.
In Figure 4, we choose P1 = 10, P2 = 20, N1 = 2, N2 = 8 and Nr = 2, which implies that N2 < N1 +P1. For
this case, the NF inner bound on CCgs reduces to the region of case 2. Compared with the secrecy capacity region
of the Gaussian BCC, it is easy to see that the maximum secrecy rate R1 of CGBCCs is enhanced by using the NF
strategy. However, when R0 is larger than 0.26, the NF strategy makes no contribution to enhance the security of
the Gaussian BCC. For the DF strategy, it enhances the maximum common rate R0 and the entire secrecy capacity
region CGBCCs . Moreover, from Figure 3 and Figure 4, we can see that there is a huge gap between the inner and
outer bounds on CCgs . Eliminating the gap (improving both the inner and outer bounds) is our future work.
Fig. 3: The inner and outer bounds on CCgs and the secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian BCC for P1 = 5,
P2 = 20, N1 = 2, N2 = 8 and Nr = 2
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Fig. 4: The inner and outer bounds on CCgs and the secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian BCC for P1 = 10,
P2 = 20, N1 = 2, N2 = 8 and Nr = 2
D. The Comparison of the DF and NF Achievable Secrecy Rates with the Previous Known Results
In this subsection, we study the achievable secrecy rates of the degraded Gaussian relay-eavesdropper channel.
First, we show the DF and NF achievable secrecy rates of the degraded Gaussian relay-eavesdropper channel. Then,
we compare our DF secrecy rate with that of [18, bottom of page 4009], and show that in some particular cases,
our result is better than Lai and El Gamal’s DF secrecy rate. Finally, we compare our NF secrecy rate with the
Gaussian case of [19, Theorem 1], and show that our NF secrecy rate is in accordance with the Gaussian case of
[19, Theorem 1].
1) Comparison of the DF Achievable Secrecy Rates of the Degraded Gaussian Relay-Eavesdropper Channel:
In the previous subsection, we have already shown that the DF inner bound on the secrecy capacity region of the
degraded Gaussian relay broadcast channel with one common and one confidential messages is given by (3.23).
Letting α = 1 (which implies that the auxiliary random variable U = const and R0 = 0), (3.23) can be served as
our DF achievable secrecy rate CCgi1s for the degraded Gaussian relay-eavesdropper channel, and it is given by
CCgi1s =
1
2
log
P1 +Nr +N1
Nr +N1
− 1
2
log
P1 +Nr +N2
Nr +N2
. (3.34)
In the Remark 3, we have already shown that for the discrete memoryless case, Lai-El Gamal’s DF achievable
secrecy rate is given by (3.8). Letting V1 = X , V2 = X1, U = const, X = cX1 + X10, X1 ∼ N (0, P2),
X10 ∼ N (0, αP1), c =
√
P1(1−α)
P2
, straightforward calculations of (3.8) result in the degraded Gaussian DF
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achievable secrecy rate CCgi1∗s , and it is given by
CCgi1∗s = min{
1
2
log
P1 + P2 +Nr +N1
Nr +N1
,
1
2
log
P1 +Nr
Nr
} − 1
2
log
P1 + P2 +Nr +N2
Nr +N2
. (3.35)
Comparing (3.34) with (3.35), we can conclude that
• If N1 ≥ N2, CCgi1s = CCgi1∗s = 0.
• If N1 ≤ N2 and P1P2 ≤ NrN1 · P1+N1+NrP1+N2+Nr , CCgi1s is larger than CCgi1∗s .
• If N1 ≤ N2 and P1P2 ≥ NrN1 · P1+N1+NrP1+N2+Nr , CCgi1∗s is larger than CCgi1s .
The following Figure 5 shows CCgi1s and C
Cgi1∗
s for fixed N1 and N2. As we can see, Lai-El Gamal’s DF
secrecy rate CCgi1∗s dominates our DF secrecy rate C
Cgi1
s when P2 and Nr are small (P2 = 1 and Nr = 0.5).
However, the gap between CCgi1s and C
Cgi1∗
s is decreasing while P2 and Nr are increasing, and our DF secrecy
rate CCgi1s dominates Lai-El Gamal’s DF secrecy rate C
Cgi1∗
s when P2 and Nr are large enough (P2 = 30 and
Nr = 4).
Fig. 5: The curves P1 − CCgi1s and P1 − CCgi1∗s for N1 = 2, N2 = 8 and several values of P2 and Nr
2) Comparison of the NF Achievable Secrecy Rates of the Degraded Gaussian Relay-Eavesdropper Channel: In
the Remark 4, we have already shown that for the discrete memoryless case, our and Lai-El Gamal’s NF achievable
secrecy rates can be characterized by (3.11). Letting V = X , X ∼ N (0, P1) and X1 ∼ N (0, P2), straightforward
calculations of (3.11) result in the degraded Gaussian NF achievable secrecy rates CCgi2s and C
Cgi2∗
s , and they are
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given by
CCgi2s = C
Cgi2∗
s =

1
2 log
P1+P2+N1
N1
− 12 log P1+P2+N2N2 , if N1 ≤ N2 ≤ N1 + P1,
1
2 log
P1+N1
N1
− 12 log P1+P2+N2P2+N2 , if N2 > N1 + P1,
0, if N2 < N1.
(3.36)
Moreover, we have also shown that for the discrete memoryless case, Tang et al.’s NF achievable secrecy rate
CCi2∗∗s is characterized by (3.12)-(3.17). Letting X ∼ N (0, P1) and X1 ∼ N (0, P2), straightforward calculations
of (3.12)-(3.17) also result in (3.36), i.e., the degraded Gaussian NF achievable secrecy rate CCgi2∗∗s of [19] satisfies
CCgi2∗∗s = C
Cgi2
s = C
Cgi2∗
s .
The following Figure 6 shows CCgi2s , C
Cgi2∗
s and C
Cgi2∗∗
s for P1 = 5, P2 = 8, N1 = 2 and Nr = 4. It is easy
to see that the secrecy rates are increasing while the noise variance N2 of the eavesdropper’s channel is increasing,
and when N2 ≤ N1, no positive secrecy rate can be achieved.
Fig. 6: The curves N2 − CCgi2s , N2 − CCgi2∗s and N2 − CCgi2∗∗s for P1 = 5, P2 = 8, N1 = 2 and Nr = 4
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we provide inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation of RBC-CM. The capacity results
are further explained via the degraded Gaussian relay broadcast channel with one common and one confidential
messages. Numerical results show that a trusted relay node helps to enhance the security of the Gaussian BCC.
Moreover, for the degraded Gaussian relay-eavesdropper channel, we find that in some particular cases, our DF
20
strategy is better than that of [18]. As for the NF strategies, we find that the NF strategies of [18], [19] and this
paper perform the same.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In this section, we will prove Theorem 1: all the achievable (R0, R1, R2, Re1, Re2) quintuples are contained in
the set RAo. The inequalities of Theorem 1 are proved in the remainder of this section.
First, define the following auxiliary random variables,
U1 , Y J−11 , U2 , Y N1,J+1, U , (Y J−1,W0, ZNJ+1, J)
V1 , (U,W1), V2 , (U,W2)
Y , YJ , Y1 , Y1,J , Z , ZJ , (A1)
where J is a random variable (uniformly distributed over {1, 2, , ..., N}), and it is independent of Y N , Y N1 , ZN ,
W0, W1 and W2.
(Proof of R0 ≤ min{I(U,U1;Y ), I(U ;Y, Y1|U1)})
The inequality R0 ≤ I(U,U1;Y ) is proved as follows.
1
N
H(W0) ≤ 1
N
(I(W0;Y
N ) +H(W0|Y N ))
(a)
≤ 1
N
(I(W0;Y
N ) + δ(Pe1))
=
1
N
(
N∑
i=1
I(W0;Yi|Y i−1) + δ(Pe1))
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|Y i−1)−H(Yi|Y i−1,W0)) + δ(Pe1)
N
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi)−H(Yi|Y i−1,W0, Y i−11 , ZNi+1)) +
δ(Pe1)
N
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(b)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|J = i)−H(Yi|Y i−1,W0, Y i−11 , ZNi+1, J = i)) +
δ(Pe1)
N
(c)
≤ H(YJ)−H(YJ |Y J−1,W0, Y J−11 , ZNJ+1, J) +
δ(Pe1)
N
(d)
= H(Y )−H(Y |U1, U) + δ(Pe1)
N
(e)
≤ I(U1, U ;Y ) + δ()
N
, (A2)
where (a) is from the Fano’s inequality, (b) is from the fact that J is a random variable (uniformly distributed over
{1, 2, ..., N}), and it is independent of Y N , Y N1 , ZN , W0, W1 and W2, (c) is from J is uniformly distributed over
{1, 2, ..., N}, (d) is from the definitions of the auxiliary random variables (see (A1)), and (e) is from Pe1 ≤ .
By using → 0, R0 = limN→∞ H(W0)N and (A2), R0 ≤ I(U,U1;Y ) is obtained.
The inequality R0 ≤ I(U ;Y, Y1|U1) is proved as follows.
1
N
H(W0) ≤ 1
N
(I(W0;Y
N
1 , Y
N ) +H(W0|Y N1 , Y N ))
≤ 1
N
(I(W0;Y
N
1 , Y
N ) + δ(Pe1))
=
1
N
(
N∑
i=1
I(W0;Y1,i, Yi|Y i−11 , Y i−1) + δ(Pe1))
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Y1,i, Yi|Y i−11 , Y i−1)−H(Y1,i, Yi|Y i−11 , Y i−1,W0)) +
δ(Pe1)
N
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Y1,i, Yi|Y i−11 )−H(Y1,i, Yi|Y i−1,W0, Y i−11 , ZNi+1)) +
δ(Pe1)
N
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Y1,i, Yi|Y i−11 , J = i)−H(Y1,i, Yi|Y i−1,W0, Y i−11 , ZNi+1, J = i)) +
δ(Pe1)
N
≤ H(YJ , Y1,J |Y J−11 )−H(YJ , Y1,J |Y J−1,W0, Y J−11 , ZNJ+1, J) +
δ(Pe1)
N
(a)
= H(Y, Y1|U1)−H(Y, Y1|U1, U) + δ(Pe1)
N
≤ I(U ;Y, Y1|U1) + δ()
N
, (A3)
where (a) is from (A1). By using → 0, R0 = limN→∞ H(W0)N and (A3), R0 ≤ I(U ;Y, Y1|U1) is obtained.
Therefore, R0 ≤ min{I(U,U1;Y ), I(U ;Y, Y1|U1)} is proved.
(Proof of R0 ≤ min{I(U,U2;Z), I(U ;Z, Y1|U2)})
The inequality R0 ≤ I(U,U2;Z) is proved as follows.
1
N
H(W0) ≤ 1
N
(I(W0;Z
N ) +H(W0|ZN ))
≤ 1
N
(I(W0;Z
N ) + δ(Pe2))
=
1
N
(
N∑
i=1
I(W0;Zi|ZNi+1) + δ(Pe2))
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=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Zi|ZNi+1)−H(Zi|ZNi+1,W0)) +
δ(Pe2)
N
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Zi)−H(Zi|Y i−1,W0, Y N1,i+1, ZNi+1)) +
δ(Pe2)
N
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Zi|J = i)−H(Zi|Y i−1,W0, Y N1,i+1, ZNi+1, J = i)) +
δ(Pe2)
N
≤ H(ZJ)−H(ZJ |Y J−1,W0, Y N1,J+1, ZNJ+1, J) +
δ(Pe2)
N
= H(Z)−H(Z|U2, U) + δ(Pe2)
N
≤ I(U2, U ;Z) + δ()
N
. (A4)
By using → 0, R0 = limN→∞ H(W0)N and (A4), R0 ≤ I(U2, U ;Z) is obtained.
The inequality R0 ≤ I(U ;Z, Y1|U2) is proved as follows.
1
N
H(W0) ≤ 1
N
(I(W0;Y
N
1 , Z
N ) +H(W0|Y N1 , ZN ))
≤ 1
N
(I(W0;Y
N
1 , Z
N ) + δ(Pe2))
=
1
N
(
N∑
i=1
I(W0;Y1,i, Zi|Y N1,i+1, ZNi+1) + δ(Pe2))
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Y1,i, Zi|Y N1,i+1, ZNi+1)−H(Y1,i, Zi|Y N1,i+1, ZNi+1,W0)) +
δ(Pe2)
N
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Y1,i, Zi|Y N1,i+1)−H(Y1,i, Zi|Y i−1,W0, Y N1,i+1, ZNi+1)) +
δ(Pe2)
N
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Y1,i, Zi|Y N1,i+1, J = i)−H(Y1,i, Zi|Y i−1,W0, Y N1,i+1, ZNi+1, J = i)) +
δ(Pe2)
N
≤ H(ZJ , Y1,J |Y N1,J+1)−H(ZJ , Y1,J |Y J−1,W0, Y N1,J+1, ZNJ+1, J) +
δ(Pe2)
N
= H(Z, Y1|U2)−H(Z, Y1|U2, U) + δ(Pe2)
N
≤ I(U ;Z, Y1|U2) + δ()
N
. (A5)
By using → 0, R0 = limN→∞ H(W0)N and (A5), R0 ≤ I(U ;Z, Y1|U2) is obtained.
Therefore, R0 ≤ min{I(U,U2;Z), I(U ;Z, Y1|U2)} is proved.
(Proof of R0 +R1 ≤ min{I(U,U1, V1;Y ), I(U, V1;Y, Y1|U1)})
The inequality R0 +R1 ≤ I(U,U1, V1;Y ) is proved as follows.
1
N
H(W0,W1) ≤ 1
N
(I(W0,W1;Y
N ) +H(W0,W1|Y N ))
≤ 1
N
(I(W0,W1;Y
N ) + δ(Pe1))
=
1
N
(
N∑
i=1
I(W0,W1;Yi|Y i−1) + δ(Pe1))
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=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|Y i−1)−H(Yi|Y i−1,W0,W1)) + δ(Pe1)
N
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi)−H(Yi|Y i−1,W0,W1, Y i−11 , ZNi+1)) +
δ(Pe1)
N
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|J = i)−H(Yi|Y i−1,W0,W1, Y i−11 , ZNi+1, J = i)) +
δ(Pe1)
N
≤ H(YJ)−H(YJ |Y J−1,W0,W1, Y J−11 , ZNJ+1, J) +
δ(Pe1)
N
= H(Y )−H(Y |U1, U, V1) + δ(Pe1)
N
≤ I(U1, U, V1;Y ) + δ()
N
. (A6)
By using → 0, R0 +R1 = limN→∞ H(W0,W1)N and (A6), R0 +R1 ≤ I(U,U1, V1;Y ) is obtained.
The inequality R0 +R1 ≤ I(U, V1;Y, Y1|U1) is proved as follows.
1
N
H(W0,W1) ≤ 1
N
(I(W0,W1;Y
N
1 , Y
N ) +H(W0,W1|Y N1 , Y N ))
≤ 1
N
(I(W0,W1;Y
N
1 , Y
N ) + δ(Pe1))
=
1
N
(
N∑
i=1
I(W0,W1;Y1,i, Yi|Y i−11 , Y i−1) + δ(Pe1))
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Y1,i, Yi|Y i−11 , Y i−1)−H(Y1,i, Yi|Y i−11 , Y i−1,W0,W1)) +
δ(Pe1)
N
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Y1,i, Yi|Y i−11 )−H(Y1,i, Yi|Y i−1,W0,W1, Y i−11 , ZNi+1)) +
δ(Pe1)
N
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Y1,i, Yi|Y i−11 , J = i)−H(Y1,i, Yi|Y i−1,W0,W1, Y i−11 , ZNi+1, J = i)) +
δ(Pe1)
N
≤ H(YJ , Y1,J |Y J−11 )−H(YJ , Y1,J |Y J−1,W0,W1, Y J−11 , ZNJ+1, J) +
δ(Pe1)
N
= H(Y, Y1|U1)−H(Y, Y1|U1, U, V1) + δ(Pe1)
N
≤ I(U, V1;Y, Y1|U1) + δ()
N
, (A7)
By using → 0, R0 +R1 = limN→∞ H(W0,W1)N and (A7), R0 +R1 ≤ I(U, V1;Y, Y1|U1) is obtained.
Therefore, R0 +R1 ≤ min{I(U,U1, V1;Y ), I(U, V1;Y, Y1|U1)} is proved.
(Proof of R0 +R2 ≤ min{I(U,U2, V2;Z), I(U, V2;Z, Y1|U2)})
The proof of R0 + R2 ≤ min{I(U,U2, V2;Z), I(U, V2;Z, Y1|U2)} is analogous to the proof of R0 + R1 ≤
min{I(U,U1, V1;Y ), I(U, V1;Y, Y1|U1)}, and it is omitted here.
(Proof of R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ I(U,U2, V1;Y, Y1|U1) + I(V2;Z, Y1|U,U1, U2, V1))
The inequality R0 + R1 + R2 ≤ I(U,U2, V1;Y, Y1|U1) + I(V2;Z, Y1|U,U1, U2, V1) is proved by the following
(A8), (A9), (A10) and (A11).
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First, note that
1
N
H(W0,W1,W2) =
1
N
(H(W0,W1) +H(W2|W0,W1))
=
1
N
(I(W0,W1;Y
N
1 , Y
N ) +H(W0,W1|Y N1 , Y N ) + I(W2;Y N1 , ZN |W0,W1)
+H(W2|W0,W1, Y N1 , ZN ))
(a)
≤ 1
N
(I(W0,W1;Y
N
1 , Y
N ) + δ(Pe1) + I(W2;Y
N
1 , Z
N |W0,W1) + δ(Pe2)), (A8)
where (a) is from Fano’s inequality.
The character I(W0,W1;Y N1 , Y
N ) in (A8) is upper bounded by
I(W0,W1;Y
N
1 , Y
N )
=
N∑
i=1
I(W0,W1;Y1,i, Yi|Y i−11 , Y i−1)
=
N∑
i=1
(H(Y1,i, Yi|Y i−11 , Y i−1)−H(Y1,i, Yi|Y i−11 , Y i−1,W0,W1)
+H(Y1,i, Yi|Y i−11 , Y i−1,W0,W1, Y N1,i+1, ZNi+1)−H(Y1,i, Yi|Y i−11 , Y i−1,W0,W1, Y N1,i+1, ZNi+1))
=
N∑
i=1
(I(Y1,i, Yi;W0,W1, Y
N
1,i+1, Z
N
i+1|Y i−11 , Y i−1)
−I(Y1,i, Yi;Y N1,i+1, ZNi+1|Y i−11 , Y i−1,W0,W1)), (A9)
and the character I(W2;Y N1 , Z
N |W0,W1) in (A8) is upper bounded by
I(W2;Y
N
1 , Z
N |W0,W1)
=
N∑
i=1
I(W2;Y1,i, Zi|Y N1,i+1, ZNi+1,W0,W1)
≤
N∑
i=1
I(W2, Y
i−1, Y i−11 ;Y1,i, Zi|Y N1,i+1, ZNi+1,W0,W1)
=
N∑
i=1
(H(Y1,i, Zi|Y N1,i+1, ZNi+1,W0,W1)
−H(Y1,i, Zi|Y N1,i+1, ZNi+1,W0,W1,W2, Y i−1, Y i−11 )
+H(Y1,i, Zi|Y N1,i+1, ZNi+1,W0,W1, Y i−1, Y i−11 )−H(Y1,i, Zi|Y N1,i+1, ZNi+1,W0,W1, Y i−1, Y i−11 )
=
N∑
i=1
(I(Y1,i, Zi;Y
i−1, Y i−11 |Y N1,i+1, ZNi+1,W0,W1)
+I(Y1,i, Zi;W2|Y N1,i+1, ZNi+1,W0,W1, Y i−1, Y i−11 )). (A10)
Here note that
∑N
i=1 I(Y1,i, Yi;Y
N
1,i+1, Z
N
i+1|Y i−11 , Y i−1,W0,W1) appeared in the last step of (A9) is equal to
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∑N
i=1 I(Y1,i, Zi;Y
i−1, Y i−11 |Y N1,i+1, ZNi+1,W0,W1) appeared in the last step of (A10), i.e.,
N∑
i=1
I(Y1,i, Yi;Y
N
1,i+1, Z
N
i+1|Y i−11 , Y i−1,W0,W1)
=
N∑
i=1
I(Y1,i, Zi;Y
i−1, Y i−11 |Y N1,i+1, ZNi+1,W0,W1), (A11)
and it is proved by the following (A12) and (A13).
N∑
i=1
I(Y1,i, Yi;Y
N
1,i+1, Z
N
i+1|Y i−11 , Y i−1,W0,W1)
=
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
I(Y1,i, Yi;Y1,j , Zj |Y i−11 , Y i−1,W0,W1, Y N1,j+1, ZNj+1). (A12)
N∑
i=1
I(Y1,i, Zi;Y
i−1, Y i−11 |Y N1,i+1, ZNi+1,W0,W1)
=
N∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=1
I(Y1,i, Zi;Y1,j , Yj |Y N1,i+1, ZNi+1,W0,W1, Y j−1, Y j−11 )
=
N∑
j=1
j−1∑
i=1
I(Y1,j , Zj ;Y1,i, Yi|Y N1,j+1, ZNj+1,W0,W1, Y i−1, Y i−11 )
=
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
I(Y1,j , Zj ;Y1,i, Yi|Y N1,j+1, ZNj+1,W0,W1, Y i−1, Y i−11 ). (A13)
Finally, substituting (A9) and (A10) into (A8), and using the fact that (A11) holds, then we have
1
N
H(W0,W1,W2)
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(Y1,i, Yi;W0,W1, Y
N
1,i+1, Z
N
i+1|Y i−11 , Y i−1)
+I(Y1,i, Zi;W2|Y N1,i+1, ZNi+1,W0,W1, Y i−1, Y i−11 )) +
δ(Pe1) + δ(Pe2)
N
(1)
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(Y1,i, Yi;W0,W1, Y
N
1,i+1, Z
N
i+1|Y i−11 , Y i−1, J = i)
+I(Y1,i, Zi;W2|Y N1,i+1, ZNi+1,W0,W1, Y i−1, Y i−11 , J = i)) +
2δ()
N
(2)
= I(Y1,J , YJ ;W0,W1, Y
N
1,J+1, Z
N
J+1|Y J−11 , Y J−1, J)
+I(Y1,J , ZJ ;W2|Y N1,J+1, ZNJ+1,W0,W1, Y J−1, Y J−11 , J) +
2δ()
N
≤ H(Y1,J , YJ |Y J−11 )−H(Y1,J , YJ |W0,W1, Y N1,J+1, ZNJ+1, Y J−11 , Y J−1, J)
+I(Y1,J , ZJ ;W2|Y N1,J+1, ZNJ+1,W0,W1, Y J−1, Y J−11 , J) +
2δ()
N
(3)
= I(Y1, Y |U1)−H(Y1, Y |U, V1, U1, U2) +H(Y1, Z|U, V1, U1, U2)
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−H(Y1, Z|U, V1, U1, U2, V2) + 2δ()
N
= I(U,U2, V1;Y, Y1|U1) + I(V2;Z, Y1|U,U1, U2, V1) + 2δ()
N
, (A14)
where (1) is from Pe1, Pe2 ≤ , J is a random variable (uniformly distributed over {1, 2, ..., N}), and it is
independent of Y N , Y N1 , Z
N , W0, W1 and W2, (2) is from J is uniformly distributed over {1, 2, ..., N}, and
(3) is from the definitions of the auxiliary random variables (see (A1)).
By using → 0, R0 +R1 +R2 = limN→∞ H(W0,W1,W2)N and (A14), R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ I(U,U2, V1;Y, Y1|U1) +
I(V2;Z, Y1|U,U1, U2, V1) is proved.
(Proof of R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ I(U,U1, V2;Z, Y1|U2) + I(V1;Y, Y1|U,U1, U2, V2))
The inequality R0+R1+R2 ≤ I(U,U1, V2;Z, Y1|U2)+I(V1;Y, Y1|U,U1, U2, V2) is proved by letting H(W0,W1,W2) =
H(W0,W2) + H(W1|W0,W2), and the remainder of the proof is analogous to the proof of R0 + R1 + R2 ≤
I(U,U2, V1;Y, Y1|U1) + I(V2;Z, Y1|U,U1, U2, V1). Thus ,we omit the proof here.
(Proof of Re1 ≤ I(V1;Y |U, V2)− I(V1;Z|U, V2))
The inequality Re1 ≤ I(V1;Y |U, V2)−I(V1;Z|U, V2) is proved by the following (A15), (A16), (A17) and (A20).
First note that
1
N
H(W1|ZN )
=
1
N
(I(W1;W0,W2|ZN ) +H(W1|ZN ,W0,W2))
≤ 1
N
(H(W1|ZN ,W0,W2) + δ())
=
1
N
(H(W1|W0,W2)− I(W1;ZN |W0,W2) + δ())
=
1
N
(I(W1;Y
N |W0,W2) +H(W1|Y N ,W0,W2)− I(W1;ZN |W0,W2) + δ())
≤ 1
N
(I(W1;Y
N |W0,W2)− I(W1;ZN |W0,W2) + 2δ()). (A15)
Then, the character I(W1;Y N |W0,W2) in (A15) is upper bounded by
I(W1;Y
N |W0,W2) =
N∑
i=1
I(W1;Yi|W0,W2, Y i−1)
=
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|W0,W2, Y i−1)−H(Yi|W0,W1,W2, Y i−1)
+H(Yi|W0,W2, Y i−1,W1, ZNi+1)−H(Yi|W0,W2, Y i−1,W1, ZNi+1))
=
N∑
i=1
(I(Yi;W1, Z
N
i+1|W0,W2, Y i−1)− I(Yi;ZNi+1|W0,W1,W2, Y i−1))
=
N∑
i=1
(I(Yi;Z
N
i+1|W0,W2, Y i−1) + I(Yi;W1|W0,W2, Y i−1, ZNi+1)
−I(Yi;ZNi+1|W0,W1,W2, Y i−1)), (A16)
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and the character I(W1;ZN |W0,W2) in (A15) can be expressed as
I(W1;Z
N |W0,W2) =
N∑
i=1
I(W1;Zi|W0,W2, ZNi+1)
=
N∑
i=1
(H(Zi|W0,W2, ZNi+1)−H(Zi|W0,W1,W2, ZNi+1)
+H(Zi|W0,W2, Y i−1,W1, ZNi+1)−H(Zi|W0,W2, Y i−1,W1, ZNi+1))
=
N∑
i=1
(I(Zi;W1, Y
i−1|W0,W2, ZNi+1)− I(Zi;Y i−1|W0,W1,W2, ZNi+1))
=
N∑
i=1
(I(Zi;Y
i−1|W0,W2, ZNi+1) + I(Zi;W1|W0,W2, Y i−1, ZNi+1)
−I(Zi;Y i−1|W0,W1,W2, ZNi+1)). (A17)
Note that
N∑
i=1
I(Yi;Z
N
i+1|W0,W2, Y i−1) =
N∑
i=1
I(Zi;Y
i−1|W0,W2, ZNi+1), (A18)
and
N∑
i=1
I(Yi;Z
N
i+1|W0,W1,W2, Y i−1) =
N∑
i=1
I(Zi;Y
i−1|W0,W1,W2, ZNi+1), (A19)
and these are from Csisza´r’s equality [3].
Substituting (A16) and (A17) into (A15), and using the equalities (A18) and (A19), we have
1
N
H(W1|ZN )
≤ 1
N
(I(W1;Y
N |W0,W2)− I(W1;ZN |W0,W2) + 2δ())
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(Yi;W1|W0,W2, Y i−1, ZNi+1)
−(Zi;W1|W0,W2, Y i−1, ZNi+1)) +
2δ()
N
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(Yi;W1|W0,W2, Y i−1, ZNi+1, J = i)
−I(Zi;W1|W0,W2, Y i−1, ZNi+1, J = i)) +
2δ()
N
= I(YJ ;W1|W0,W2, Y J−1, ZNJ+1, J)
−I(ZJ ;W1|W0,W2, Y J−1, ZNJ+1, J) +
2δ()
N
= I(Y ;V1|U, V2)− I(Z;V1|U, V2) + 2δ()
N
. (A20)
By using → 0, Re1 ≤ limN→∞ H(W1|Z
N )
N and (A20), Re1 ≤ I(V1;Y |U, V2)− I(V1;Z|U, V2) is proved.
(Proof of Re1 ≤ I(V1;Y |U)− I(V1;Z|U))
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The inequality Re1 ≤ I(V1;Y |U)− I(V1;Z|U) is proved by the following (A21), (A22), (A23) and (A26). First
note that
1
N
H(W1|ZN )
=
1
N
(I(W1;W0|ZN ) +H(W1|ZN ,W0))
≤ 1
N
(H(W1|ZN ,W0) + δ())
=
1
N
(H(W1|W0)− I(W1;ZN |W0) + δ())
=
1
N
(I(W1;Y
N |W0) +H(W1|Y N ,W0)− I(W1;ZN |W0) + δ())
≤ 1
N
(I(W1;Y
N |W0)− I(W1;ZN |W0) + 2δ()). (A21)
Then, the character I(W1;Y N |W0) in (A21) is upper bounded by
I(W1;Y
N |W0) =
N∑
i=1
I(W1;Yi|W0, Y i−1)
=
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|W0, Y i−1)−H(Yi|W0,W1, Y i−1)
+H(Yi|W0, Y i−1,W1, ZNi+1)−H(Yi|W0, Y i−1,W1, ZNi+1))
=
N∑
i=1
(I(Yi;W1, Z
N
i+1|W0, Y i−1)− I(Yi;ZNi+1|W0,W1, Y i−1))
=
N∑
i=1
(I(Yi;Z
N
i+1|W0, Y i−1) + I(Yi;W1|W0, Y i−1, ZNi+1)
−I(Yi;ZNi+1|W0,W1, Y i−1)), (A22)
and the character I(W1;ZN |W0) in (A21) can be expressed as
I(W1;Z
N |W0) =
N∑
i=1
I(W1;Zi|W0, ZNi+1)
=
N∑
i=1
(H(Zi|W0, ZNi+1)−H(Zi|W0,W1, ZNi+1)
+H(Zi|W0, Y i−1,W1, ZNi+1)−H(Zi|W0, Y i−1,W1, ZNi+1))
=
N∑
i=1
(I(Zi;W1, Y
i−1|W0, ZNi+1)− I(Zi;Y i−1|W0,W1, ZNi+1))
=
N∑
i=1
(I(Zi;Y
i−1|W0, ZNi+1) + I(Zi;W1|W0, Y i−1, ZNi+1)
−I(Zi;Y i−1|W0,W1, ZNi+1)). (A23)
Note that
N∑
i=1
I(Yi;Z
N
i+1|W0, Y i−1) =
N∑
i=1
I(Zi;Y
i−1|W0, ZNi+1), (A24)
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and
N∑
i=1
I(Yi;Z
N
i+1|W0,W1, Y i−1) =
N∑
i=1
I(Zi;Y
i−1|W0,W1, ZNi+1), (A25)
and these are from Csisza´r’s equality [3].
Substituting (A22) and (A23) into (A21), and using the equalities (A24) and (A25), we have
1
N
H(W1|ZN )
≤ 1
N
(I(W1;Y
N |W0)− I(W1;ZN |W0) + 2δ())
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(Yi;W1|W0, Y i−1, ZNi+1)
−(Zi;W1|W0, Y i−1, ZNi+1)) +
2δ()
N
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(Yi;W1|W0, Y i−1, ZNi+1, J = i)
−I(Zi;W1|W0, Y i−1, ZNi+1, J = i)) +
2δ()
N
= I(YJ ;W1|W0, Y J−1, ZNJ+1, J)
−I(ZJ ;W1|W0, Y J−1, ZNJ+1, J) +
2δ()
N
= I(Y ;V1|U)− I(Z;V1|U) + 2δ()
N
. (A26)
By using → 0, Re1 ≤ limN→∞ H(W1|Z
N )
N and (A26), Re1 ≤ I(V1;Y |U)− I(V1;Z|U) is proved.
(Proof of Re2 ≤ min{I(V2;Z|U, V1)− I(V2;Y |U, V1), I(V2;Z|U)− I(V2;Y |U)})
The proof of Re2 ≤ min{I(V2;Z|U, V1)− I(V2;Y |U, V1), I(V2;Z|U)− I(V2;Y |U)} is analogous to the proof
of Re1 ≤ min{I(V1;Y |U, V2)− I(V1;Z|U, V2), I(V1;Y |U)− I(V1;Z|U)}, and therefore, we omit the proof here.
The Markov chain U → (U1, U2, V1, V2) → (X,X1) → (Y, Y1, Z) is directly proved by the definitions of the
auxiliary random variables. Thus, the proof of Theorem 1 is completed.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Suppose (R0, R1, R2, Re1, Re2) ∈ R(Ai1), we will show that (R0, R1, R2, Re1, Re2) is achievable, i.e., there
exists encoder-decoder (N,∆1,∆2, Pe1, Pe2) such that (2.3) is satisfied. The existence of the encoder-decoder is
under the sufficient conditions that
Re1 = I(V1;Y |U,X1)− I(V1;V2|U,X1)− I(V1;Z|U,X1, V2), (A27)
and
Re2 = I(V2;Z|U,X1)− I(V1;V2|U,X1)− I(V2;Y |U,X1, V1). (A28)
The coding scheme combines the decode and forward (DF) strategy [10], random binning, superposition coding,
block Markov coding and rate splitting techniques. The rate splitting technique is typically used in the interference
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channels to achieve a larger rate region as it enables interference cancellation at the receivers. Now we use it to
split the confidential message W1 into W10 and W11, and W2 into W20 and W22, and the details are as follows.
Define the messages W0, W10, W11, W20, W22 taken values in the alphabets W0, W10, W11, W20, W22,
respectively, where
W0 = {1, 2, ..., 2NR0},
W10 = {1, 2, ..., 2NR10},
W11 = {1, 2, ..., 2NR11},
W20 = {1, 2, ..., 2NR20},
W22 = {1, 2, ..., 2NR22},
and R10 + R11 = R1, R20 + R22 = R2. Here note that the formulas (A27) and (A28) combined with the rate
splitting and the fact that W10 and W20 are decoded by both receivers ensure that,
R11 ≥ Re1 = I(V1;Y |U,X1)− I(V1;V2|U,X1)− I(V1;Z|U,X1, V2), (A29)
and
R22 ≥ Re2 = I(V2;Z|U,X1)− I(V1;V2|U,X1)− I(V2;Y |U,X1, V1). (A30)
Code Construction: Fix the joint probability mass function PY,Z,Y1,X,X1,V1,V2,U (y, z, y1, x, x1, v1, v2, u). For
arbitrary  > 0, define
L11 = I(V1;Y |U,X1)− I(V1;V2|U,X1)− I(V1;Z|U,X1, V2), (A31)
L12 = I(V1;Z|U,X1, V2), (A32)
L21 = I(V2;Z|U,X1)− I(V1;V2|U,X1)− I(V2;Y |U,X1, V1), (A33)
L22 = I(V2;Y |U,X1, V1), (A34)
L3 = I(V1;V2|U,X1)− . (A35)
Note that
L11 + L12 + L3 = I(V1;Y |U,X1)− , (A36)
L21 + L22 + L3 = I(V2;Z|U,X1)− . (A37)
• First, generate at random 2NRr i.i.d. sequences at the relay node each drawn according to pXN1 (x
N
1 ) =∏N
i=1 pX1(x1,i), index them as x
N
1 (a), a ∈ [1, 2NRr ], where
Rr = min{I(X1;Y ), I(X1;Z)} − . (A38)
• Generate at random 2N(R10+R20+R0) i.i.d. sequences uN (b|a) (b ∈ [1, 2N(R10+R20+R0)], a ∈ [1, 2NRr ])
according to
∏N
i=1 pU |X1(ui|x1,i). In addition, partition 2N(R10+R20+R0) i.i.d. sequences uN into 2NRr bins.
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These bins are denoted as {S1, S2, ..., S2NRr }, where Si (1 ≤ i ≤ 2NRr ) contains 2N(R10+R20+R0−Rr)
sequences about uN .
• For the transmitted sequences uN and xN1 , generate 2
N(L11+L12+L3) i.i.d. sequences vN1 (i
′
, i
′′
, i
′′′
), with i
′ ∈
I ′ = [1, 2NL11 ], i′′ ∈ I ′′ = [1, 2NL12 ] and i′′′ ∈ I ′′′ = [1, 2NL3 ], according to ∏Ni=1 pV1|U,X1(v1,i|ui, x1,i).
• Similarly, for the transmitted sequences uN and xN1 , generate 2
N(L21+L22+L3) i.i.d. sequences vN2 (j
′
, j
′′
, j
′′′
),
with j
′ ∈ J ′ = [1, 2NL21 ], j′′ ∈ J ′′ = [1, 2NL22 ] and j′′′ ∈ J ′′′ = [1, 2NL3 ], according to∏Ni=1 pV2|U,X1(v2,i|ui, x1,i).
• The xN is generated according to a new discrete memoryless channel (DMC) with inputs xN1 , u
N , vN1 , v
N
2
and output xN . The transition probability of this new DMC is pX|X1,U,V1,V2(x|x1, u, v1, v2). The probability
pXN |XN1 ,UN ,V N1 ,V N2 (x
N |xN1 , uN , vN1 , vN2 ) is calculated as follows.
pXN |XN1 ,UN ,V N1 ,V N2 (x
N |xN1 , uN , vN1 , vN2 ) =
N∏
i=1
pX|X1,U,V1,V2(xi|x1,i, ui, v1,i, v2,i). (A39)
Denote xN by xN (a,w0, w10, w20, w11, w22).
Encoding: Encoding involves the mapping of message indices to channel inputs, which are facilitated by the
sequences generated above. We exploit the block Markov coding scheme, as argued in [10], the loss induced by
this scheme is negligible as the number of blocks n→∞. For block i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), encoding proceeds as follows.
First, for convenience, define w∗0,i = (w0,i, w10,i, w20,i), where w0,i, w10,i and w20,i are the messages transmitted
in the i-th block. The messages w11 and w22 transmitted in the i-th block are denoted by w11,i and w22,i, respectively.
• (Channel encoder)
1) The transmitter sends (uN (w∗0,1|1), vN1 (i
′
1, i
′′
1 , i
′′′
1 |1, w∗0,1), vN2 (j
′
1, j
′′
1 , j
′′′
1 |1, w∗0,1)) at the first block,
(uN (w∗0,i|ai−1), vN1 (i
′
i, i
′′
i , i
′′′
i |ai−1, w∗0,i), vN2 (j
′
i , j
′′
i , j
′′′
i |ai−1, w∗0,i)) from block 2 to n− 1, and
(uN (1|an−1), vN1 (1, 1, 1|an−1, 1), vN2 (1, 1, 1|an−1, 1)) at block n. Here i
′
i, i
′′
i , i
′′′
i , j
′
i , j
′′
i and j
′′′
i are the indexes
for block i.
2) In the i-th block (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the indexes i′i, i
′′
i , j
′
i and j
′′
i are determined by the following methods.
– If R11 ≤ L11 + L12, define W11 = I ′ ×K1. Thus the index i′i is determined by a given message w11,i.
Evenly partition I ′′ into K1 bins, and the index i′′i is drawn at random (with uniform distribution) from
the bin k1.
Analogously, if R22 ≤ L21 + L22, define W22 = J ′ × K2. Thus the index j′i is determined by a given
message w22,i. Evenly partition J ′′ into K2 bins, and the index j′′i is drawn at random (with uniform
distribution) from the bin k2.
– If L11+L12 ≤ R11 ≤ L11+L12+L3, defineW11 = I ′×I ′′×K1. Thus the indexes i′i and i
′′
i are determined
by a given message w11,i. Evenly partition I ′′′ into K1 bins, and the codeword vN1 (i
′
i, i
′′
i , i
′′′
i |ai−1, w∗0,i)
will be drawn from the bin k1.
Analogously, if L21 + L22 ≤ R22 ≤ L21 + L22 + L3, define W22 = J ′ ×J ′′ ×K2. Thus the indexes j′i
and j
′′
i are determined by a given message w22,i. Evenly partition J
′′′
into K2 bins, and the codeword
vN2 (j
′
i , j
′′
i , j
′′′
i |ai−1, w∗0,i) will be drawn from the bin k2.
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3) In the i-th block (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the indexes i′′′i and j
′′′
i are determined as follows.
After the determination of i
′
i, i
′′
i , j
′
i and j
′′
i , the transmitter tries to find a pair
(vN1 (i
′
i, i
′′
i , i
′′′
i |ai−1, w∗0,i), vN2 (j
′
i , j
′′
i , j
′′′
i |ai−1, w∗0,i))
such that (uN (w∗0,i|ai−1), xN1 (ai−1), vN1 (i
′
i, i
′′
i , i
′′′
i |ai−1, w∗0,i), vN2 (j
′
i , j
′′
i , j
′′′
i |ai−1, w∗0,i)) are jointly typical. If
there are more than one such pair, randomly choose one; if there is no such pair, an error is declared. Thus,
all the indexes of vN1 and v
N
2 (in block i) are determined. One can show that such a pair exists with high
probability for sufficiently large N if (see [11])
I(V1;Y |U,X1)− −R11 + I(V2;Z|U,X1)− −R22 ≥ I(V1;V2|U,X1). (A40)
4) In the i-th block (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the transmitter finally sends xN (ai−1, w0,i, w10,i, w20,i, w11,i, w22,i).
• (Relay encoder)
The relay sends xN1 (1) at the first block, and x
N
1 (aˆi−1) from block 2 to n.
Decoding: Decoding proceeds as follows.
1) (At the relay) At the end of block i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the relay already has an estimation of the ai−1 (denoted
as aˆi−1), which was sent at block i − 1, and will declare that it receives aˆi, if this is the only triple such that
(uN (wˆ∗0,i|aˆi−1), xN1 (aˆi−1), yN1 (i)) are jointly typical. Here note that yN1 (i) indicates the output sequence yN1 in
block i, and aˆi is the index of the bin that wˆ∗0,i belongs to. Based on the AEP, the probability Pr{aˆi = ai} goes
to 1 if
R0 +R10 +R20 ≤ I(U ;Y1|X1). (A41)
2) (At receiver 1) Receiver 1 decodes from the last block, i.e., block n. Suppose that at the end of block n−1, the
relay decodes successfully, then receiver 1 will declare that aˇn−1 is received if (xN1 (aˇn−1), y
N (n)) jointly typical.
By using (A38) and the AEP, it is easy to see that the probability Pr{aˇn−1 = an−1} goes to 1. After getting aˇn−1,
receiver 1 can get an estimation of ai (1 ≤ i ≤ n− 2) in a similar way.
Having aˇi−1, receiver 1 can get the estimation of the message w∗0,i = (w0,i, w10,i, w20,i) by finding a unique triple
such that (uN (wˇ∗0,i|aˇi−1), xN1 (aˇi−1), yN (i)) are jointly typical. Based on the AEP, the probability Pr{wˇ∗0,i = w∗0,i}
goes to 1 if
R0 +R10 +R20 −Rr ≤ I(U ;Y |X1). (A42)
After decoding wˇ∗0,i, receiver 1 tries to find a quadruple such that
(vN1 (ˇi
′
i, iˇ
′′
i , iˇ
′′′
i |aˇi−1, wˇ∗0,i), uN (wˇ∗0,i|aˇi−1), xN1 (aˇi−1), yN (i)) are jointly typical. Based on the AEP, the probability
Pr{wˇ11,i = w11,i} goes to 1 if
R11 ≤ I(V1;Y |U,X1). (A43)
If such vN1 (ˇi
′
i, iˇ
′′
i , iˇ
′′′
i |aˇi−1, wˇ∗0,i) exists and is unique, set iˇ
′
i = i
′
i, iˇ
′′
i = i
′′
i and iˇ
′′′
i = i
′′′
i ; otherwise, declare an error.
From the values of iˇ
′
i, iˇ
′′
i , iˇ
′′′
i , and the above encoding schemes, receiver 1 can calculate the message wˇ11,i.
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(At receiver 2) The decoding scheme for receiver 2 is symmetric, and it is omitted here. Analogously, we have
R0 +R10 +R20 −Rr ≤ I(U ;Z|X1), (A44)
and
R22 ≤ I(V2;Z|U,X1). (A45)
By using (A38), (A40), (A41), (A42), (A43), (A44) and (A45), it is easy to check that Pe1 ≤  and Pe2 ≤ .
Moreover, applying Fourier-Motzkin elimination on (A38), (A40), (A41), (A42), (A43), (A44) and (A45) with the
definitions R1 = R10 +R11 and R2 = R20 +R22, we get
R0 ≤ min{I(U ;Y1|X1), I(U,X1;Y ), I(U,X1;Z)},
R0 +R1 ≤ min{I(U ;Y1|X1), I(U,X1;Y ), I(U,X1;Z)}+ I(V1;Y |U,X1),
R0 +R2 ≤ min{I(U ;Y1|X1), I(U,X1;Y ), I(U,X1;Z)}+ I(V2;Z|U,X1),
R0+R1+R2 ≤ min{I(U ;Y1|X1), I(U,X1;Y ), I(U,X1;Z)}+I(V1;Y |U,X1)+I(V2;Z|U,X1)−I(V1;V2|U,X1).
Note that the above inequalities are the same as those in Theorem 2.
Equivocation Analysis: Now, it remains to prove limN→∞∆1 ≥ Re1 = I(V1;Y |U,X1) − I(V1;V2|U,X1) −
I(V1;Z|U,X1, V2). The bound limN→∞∆2 ≥ Re2 = I(V2;Z|U,X1) − I(V1;V2|U,X1) − I(V2;Y |U,X1, V1)
follows by symmetry.
H(W1|ZN ) ≥ H(W1|ZN , V N2 , UN , XN1 )
= H(W10,W11|ZN , V N2 , UN , XN1 )
(a)
= H(W11|ZN , V N2 , UN , XN1 )
= H(W11, Z
N |V N2 , UN , XN1 )−H(ZN |V N2 , UN , XN1 )
= H(W11, Z
N , V N1 |V N2 , UN , XN1 )−H(V N1 |W11, ZN , V N2 , UN , XN1 )−H(ZN |V N2 , UN , XN1 )
≥ H(ZN , V N1 |V N2 , UN , XN1 )−H(V N1 |W11, ZN , V N2 , UN , XN1 )−H(ZN |V N2 , UN , XN1 )
= H(V N1 |V N2 , UN , XN1 ) +H(ZN |V N1 , V N2 , UN , XN1 )−H(V N1 |W11, ZN , V N2 , UN , XN1 )
−H(ZN |V N2 , UN , XN1 )
= H(V N1 |UN , XN1 )− I(V N1 ;V N2 |UN , XN1 )− I(ZN ;V N1 |V N2 , UN , XN1 )
−H(V N1 |W11, ZN , V N2 , UN , XN1 ), (A46)
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where (a) follows from the fact that given UN , W10 is uniquely determined.
Consider the first term in (A46), the codeword generation ensures that
H(V N1 |UN , XN1 ) ≥ log 2N(L11+L12+L3) − δ = N(I(V1;Y |U,X1)− )− δ, (A47)
where δ is small for sufficiently large N .
For the second and third terms in (A46), using the same approach as that in [3, Lemma 3], we get
I(V N1 ;V
N
2 |UN , XN1 ) ≤ N(I(V1;V2|U,X1) + 
′
), (A48)
and
I(ZN ;V N1 |V N2 , UN , XN1 ) ≤ N(I(V1;Z|U,X1, V2) + 
′′
), (A49)
where 
′
, 
′′ → 0 as N →∞.
Now, we consider the last term of (A46). For the case that R11 ≤ L11 +L12, given UN , XN1 , V N2 and W11, the
total number of possible codewords of V N1 is
N1 ≤ 2NL12 = 2NI(V1;Z|U,X1,V2). (A50)
By using the Fano’s inequality and (A50), we have
H(V N1 |W11, ZN , V N2 , UN , XN1 ) ≤ N
′′′
, (A51)
where 
′′′ → 0.
For the case that L11 +L12 ≤ R11 ≤ L11 +L12 +L3, given UN , XN1 , V N2 and W11, V N1 is totally determined,
and therefore
H(V N1 |W11, ZN , V N2 , UN , XN1 ) = 0. (A52)
Substituting (A47), (A48), (A49) and (A51) (or (A52)) into (A46), and using the definition (2.3), we have
limN→∞∆1 ≥ Re1 = I(V1;Y |U,X1)−I(V1;V2|U,X1)−I(V1;Z|U,X1, V2). This completes the proof of Theorem
2.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
We consider the proof of Theorem 3 for the case I(X1;Y ) > I(X1;Z|U, V2), and the proof for I(X1;Z) >
I(X1;Y |U, V1) follows by symmetry.
In Theorem 3, the relay node does not attempt to decode the messages but sends codewords that are independent of
the transmitter’s messages, and these codewords aid in confusing the receivers. Since the channel between the relay
and receiver 1 is better than the channel between the relay and receiver 2 (I(X1;Y ) > I(X1;Z|U, V2) ≥ I(X1;Z)),
we allow receiver 1 to decode the relay codeword, and receiver 2 can not decode it. Therefore, in this case, the
relay codeword can be viewed as a noise signal to confuse receiver 2.
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Now we will prove that the quintuple (R0, R1, R2, Re1, Re2) ∈ R(Ai2) with the conditions
Re1 = min{I(X1;Z|U, V1, V2), I(X1;Y )}+ I(V1;Y |U,X1)− I(V1;V2|U)− I(X1, V1;Z|U, V2), (A53)
and
Re2 = I(V2;Z|U)− I(V1;V2|U)− I(V2;Y |U,X1, V1), (A54)
is achievable.
Similar to the proof of Theorem 2, we split the confidential message W1 into W10 and W11, and W2 into W20
and W22, and the definitions of these messages are the same as those in Appendix B. Here note that the formulas
(A53) and (A54) combined with the rate splitting and the fact that W10 and W20 are decoded by both receivers
ensure that,
R11 ≥ Re1 = min{I(X1;Z|U, V1, V2), I(X1;Y )}+ I(V1;Y |U,X1)− I(V1;V2|U)− I(X1, V1;Z|U, V2), (A55)
and
R22 ≥ Re2 = I(V2;Z|U)− I(V1;V2|U)− I(V2;Y |U,X1, V1). (A56)
Code Construction: Fix the joint probability mass function
PY,Z,Y1,X,X1,V1,V2,U (y, z, y1, x, x1, v1, v2, u) = PY,Z,Y1|X,X1(y, z, y1|x, x1)PX|U,V1,V2(x|u, v1, v2)PU,V1,V2(u, v1, v2)PX1(x1).
For arbitrary  > 0, define
L11 = I(V1;Y |U,X1)− I(V1;V2|U)− I(V1;Z|U, V2), (A57)
L12 = I(V1;Z|U, V2), (A58)
L21 = I(V2;Z|U)− I(V1;V2|U)− I(V2;Y |U,X1, V1), (A59)
L22 = I(V2;Y |U,X1, V1), (A60)
L3 = I(V1;V2|U)− . (A61)
Note that
L11 + L12 + L3 = I(V1;Y |U,X1)− , (A62)
L21 + L22 + L3 = I(V2;Z|U)− , (A63)
L11 ≥ Re1. (A64)
• First, generate at random 2NRr i.i.d. sequences at the relay node each drawn according to pXN1 (x
N
1 ) =∏N
i=1 pX1(x1,i), index them as x
N
1 (a), a ∈ [1, 2NRr ], where
Rr = min{I(X1;Z|U, V1, V2), I(X1;Y )} − , (A65)
and → 0+. Note that I(X1;Z|U, V2) ≤ I(X1;Z|U, V1, V2) and I(X1;Z|U, V2) ≤ I(X1;Y ), and thus
Rr ≥ I(X1;Z|U, V2)− , (A66)
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and
Rr ≤ I(X1;Z|U, V1, V2)− . (A67)
• Generate at random 2N(R10+R20+R0) i.i.d. sequences uN (b) (b ∈ [1, 2N(R10+R20+R0)]) according to∏Ni=1 pU (ui).
• For the transmitted sequence uN (b), generate 2N(L11+L12+L3) i.i.d. sequences vN1 (i
′
, i
′′
, i
′′′
), with i
′ ∈ I ′ =
[1, 2NL11 ], i
′′ ∈ I ′′ = [1, 2NL12 ] and i′′′ ∈ I ′′′ = [1, 2NL3 ], according to ∏Ni=1 pV1|U (v1,i|ui).
• Similarly, for the transmitted sequences uN and xN1 , generate 2
N(L21+L22+L3) i.i.d. sequences vN2 (j
′
, j
′′
, j
′′′
),
with j
′ ∈ J ′ = [1, 2NL21 ], j′′ ∈ J ′′ = [1, 2NL22 ] and j′′′ ∈ J ′′′ = [1, 2NL3 ], according to∏Ni=1 pV2|U (v2,i|ui).
• The xN is generated according to a new discrete memoryless channel (DMC) with inputs uN , vN1 , v
N
2 and out-
put xN . The transition probability of this new DMC is pX|U,V1,V2(x|u, v1, v2). The probability pXN |UN ,V N1 ,V N2 (xN |uN , vN1 , vN2 )
is calculated as follows.
pXN |UN ,V N1 ,V N2 (x
N |uN , vN1 , vN2 ) =
N∏
i=1
pX|U,V1,V2(xi|ui, v1,i, v2,i). (A68)
Denote xN by xN (w0, w10, w20, w11, w22).
Encoding: Similar to the definitions in Appendix B, define w∗0,i = (w0,i, w10,i, w20,i), where w0,i, w10,i and
w20,i are the messages transmitted in the i-th block. The messages w11 and w22 transmitted in the i-th block are
denoted by w11,i and w22,i, respectively.
• (Channel encoder)
1) The transmitter sends (uN (w∗0,i), v
N
1 (i
′
i, i
′′
i , i
′′′
i |w∗0,i), vN2 (j
′
i , j
′′
i , j
′′′
i |w∗0,i)) for the i-th block (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
Here i
′
i, i
′′
i , i
′′′
i , j
′
i , j
′′
i and j
′′′
i are the indexes for block i.
2) The indexes i
′
i, i
′′
i , j
′
i and j
′′
i are determined by the following methods.
– If R11 ≤ L11, evenly partition I ′ into W11 bins, and the index i′i is drawn at random (with uniform
distribution) from the bin w11. The index i
′′
i is drawn at random (with uniform distribution) from I
′′
.
Note that R22 always satisfies R22 ≥ L21.
– If L11 ≤ R11 ≤ L11 + L12, define W11 = I ′ ×K1. Thus the index i′i is determined by a given message
w11,i. Evenly partition I ′′ into K1 bins, and the index i′′i is drawn at random (with uniform distribution)
from the bin k1.
Analogously, if R22 ≤ L21 + L22, define W22 = J ′ × K2. Thus the index j′i is determined by a given
message w22,i. Evenly partition J ′′ into K2 bins, and the index j′′i is drawn at random (with uniform
distribution) from the bin k2.
– If L11+L12 ≤ R11 ≤ L11+L12+L3, defineW11 = I ′×I ′′×K1. Thus the indexes i′i and i
′′
i are determined
by a given message w11,i. Evenly partition I ′′′ into K1 bins, and the codeword vN1 (i
′
i, i
′′
i , i
′′′
i |w∗0,i) will
be drawn from the bin k1.
Analogously, if L21 + L22 ≤ R22 ≤ L21 + L22 + L3, define W22 = J ′ ×J ′′ ×K2. Thus the indexes j′i
and j
′′
i are determined by a given message w22,i. Evenly partition J
′′′
into K2 bins, and the codeword
vN2 (j
′
i , j
′′
i , j
′′′
i |w∗0,i) will be drawn from the bin k2.
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3) The indexes i
′′′
i and j
′′′
i are determined as follows.
After the determination of i
′
i, i
′′
i , j
′
i and j
′′
i , the transmitter tries to find a pair (v
N
1 (i
′
i, i
′′
i , i
′′′
i |w∗0,i), vN2 (j
′
i , j
′′
i , j
′′′
i |w∗0,i))
such that (uN (w∗0,i), v
N
1 (i
′
i, i
′′
i , i
′′′
i |w∗0,i), vN2 (j
′
i , j
′′
i , j
′′′
i |w∗0,i)) are jointly typical. If there are more than one such
pair, randomly choose one; if there is no such pair, an error is declared. Thus, all the indexes of vN1 and v
N
2
(in block i) are determined. One can show that such a pair exists with high probability for sufficiently large
N if (see [11])
I(V1;Y |U,X1)− −R11 + I(V2;Z|U)− −R22 ≥ I(V1;V2|U). (A69)
4) The transmitter finally sends xN (w0,i, w10,i, w20,i, w11,i, w22,i).
• (Relay encoder)
In the i-th block, the relay uniformly picks a codeword xN1 (ai) from ai ∈ [1, 2NRr ], and sends xN1 (ai).
Decoding: Decoding proceeds as follows.
(At receiver 1) At the end of block i, receiver 1 will declare that aˇi is received if (xN1 (aˇi), y
N (i)) are jointly
typical. By using (A65) and the AEP, it is easy to see that the probability Pr{aˇi = ai} goes to 1.
Having aˇi, receiver 1 can get the estimation of the message w∗0,i = (w0,i, w10,i, w20,i) by finding a unique triple
such that (uN (wˇ∗0,i), x
N
1 (aˇi), y
N (i)) are jointly typical. Based on the AEP, the probability Pr{wˇ∗0,i = w∗0,i} goes
to 1 if
R0 +R10 +R20 ≤ I(U ;Y |X1). (A70)
After decoding wˇ∗0,i, receiver 1 tries to find a quadruple such that
(vN1 (ˇi
′
i, iˇ
′′
i , iˇ
′′′
i |wˇ∗0,i), uN (wˇ∗0,i), xN1 (aˇi), yN (i)) are jointly typical. Based on the AEP, the probability Pr{wˇ11,i =
w11,i} goes to 1 if
R11 ≤ I(V1;Y |U,X1). (A71)
If such vN1 (ˇi
′
i, iˇ
′′
i , iˇ
′′′
i |wˇ∗0,i) exists and is unique, set iˇ
′
i = i
′
i, iˇ
′′
i = i
′′
i and iˇ
′′′
i = i
′′′
i ; otherwise, declare an error. From
the values of iˇ
′
i, iˇ
′′
i , iˇ
′′′
i , and the above encoding schemes, receiver 1 can calculate the message wˇ11,i.
(At receiver 2) The decoding scheme for receiver 2 is as follows.
Receiver 2 gets the estimation of the message w∗0,i by finding a unique pair such that (u
N (wˆ∗0,i), z
N (i)) are
jointly typical. Based on the AEP, the probability Pr{wˆ∗0,i = w∗0,i} goes to 1 if
R0 +R10 +R20 ≤ I(U ;Z). (A72)
After decoding wˆ∗0,i, receiver 2 tries to find a triple such that (v
N
2 (jˆ
′
i , jˆ
′′
i , jˆ
′′′
i |wˆ∗0,i), uN (wˆ∗0,i), zN (i)) are jointly
typical. Based on the AEP, the probability Pr{wˆ22,i = w22,i} goes to 1 if
R22 ≤ I(V2;Z|U). (A73)
If such vN2 (jˆ
′
i , jˆ
′′
i , jˆ
′′′
i |wˆ∗0,i) exists and is unique, set jˆ
′
i = j
′
i , jˆ
′′
i = j
′′
i and jˆ
′′′
i = j
′′′
i ; otherwise, declare an error.
From the values of jˆ
′
i , jˆ
′′
i , jˆ
′′′
i , and the above encoding schemes, receiver 2 can calculate the message wˆ22,i.
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By using (A65), (A69), (A70), (A71), (A72) and (A73), it is easy to check that Pe1 ≤  and Pe2 ≤ . Moreover,
applying Fourier-Motzkin elimination on (A65), (A69), (A70), (A71), (A72) and (A73) with the definitions R1 =
R10 +R11 and R2 = R20 +R22, we get
R0 ≤ min{I(U ;Y |X1), I(U ;Z)},
R0 +R1 ≤ min{I(U ;Y |X1), I(U ;Z)}+ I(V1;Y |U,X1),
R0 +R2 ≤ min{I(U ;Y |X1), I(U ;Z)}+ I(V2;Z|U),
R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ min{I(U ;Y |X1), I(U ;Z)}+ I(V1;Y |U,X1) + I(V2;Z|U)− I(V1;V2|U).
Note that the above inequalities are the same as those in Theorem 3.
Equivocation Analysis: Now, it remains to prove limN→∞∆1 ≥ Re1 = min{I(X1;Z|U, V1, V2), I(X1;Y )}+
I(V1;Y |U,X1) − I(V1;V2|U) − I(X1, V1;Z|U, V2) and limN→∞∆2 ≥ Re2 = I(V2;Z|U) − I(V1;V2|U) −
I(V2;Y |U,X1, V1).
Proof of limN→∞∆1 ≥ Re1 = min{I(X1;Z|U, V1, V2), I(X1;Y )}+I(V1;Y |U,X1)−I(V1;V2|U)−I(X1, V1;Z|U, V2):
H(W1|ZN ) ≥ H(W1|ZN , V N2 , UN )
= H(W10,W11|ZN , V N2 , UN )
(a)
= H(W11|ZN , V N2 , UN )
= H(W11, Z
N |V N2 , UN )−H(ZN |V N2 , UN )
= H(W11, Z
N , V N1 , X
N
1 |V N2 , UN )−H(V N1 , XN1 |W11, ZN , V N2 , UN )−H(ZN |V N2 , UN )
≥ H(ZN , V N1 , XN1 |V N2 , UN )−H(V N1 , XN1 |W11, ZN , V N2 , UN )−H(ZN |V N2 , UN )
= H(V N1 , X
N
1 |V N2 , UN ) +H(ZN |V N1 , V N2 , UN , XN1 )−H(V N1 , XN1 |W11, ZN , V N2 , UN )
−H(ZN |V N2 , UN )
(b)
= H(XN1 ) +H(V
N
1 |V N2 , UN ) +H(ZN |V N1 , V N2 , UN , XN1 )−H(V N1 , XN1 |W11, ZN , V N2 , UN )
−H(ZN |V N2 , UN )
= H(XN1 ) +H(V
N
1 |UN )− I(V N1 ;V N2 |UN ) +H(ZN |V N1 , V N2 , UN , XN1 )
−H(V N1 , XN1 |W11, ZN , V N2 , UN )−H(ZN |V N2 , UN )
= H(XN1 ) +H(V
N
1 |UN )− I(V N1 ;V N2 |UN )− I(ZN ;XN1 , V N1 |V N2 , UN )
−H(V N1 , XN1 |W11, ZN , V N2 , UN ), (A74)
39
where (a) follows from the fact that given UN , W10 is uniquely determined, and (b) is from that XN1 is independent
of V N1 , V
N
2 and U
N .
Consider the first term in (A74), the codeword generation ensures that
H(XN1 ) ≥ NRr − δ = N(min{I(X1;Z|U, V1, V2), I(X1;Y )} − )− δ, (A75)
where δ is small for sufficiently large N .
For the second term in (A74), similarly we have
H(V N1 |UN ) ≥ log 2N(L11+L12+L3) − δ1 = N(I(V1;Y |U,X1)− )− δ1, (A76)
where δ1 is small for sufficiently large N .
For the third and fourth terms in (A74), using the same approach as that in [3, Lemma 3], we get
I(V N1 ;V
N
2 |UN ) ≤ N(I(V1;V2|U) + 
′
), (A77)
and
I(ZN ;XN1 , V
N
1 |V N2 , UN ) ≤ N(I(X1, V1;Z|U, V2) + 
′′
), (A78)
where 
′
, 
′′ → 0 as N →∞.
Now, we consider the last term of (A74). Given W11, receiver 2 can do joint decoding.
• For the case that R11 ≤ L11, given UN , V N2 , W11 and 
′′′ → 0+,
H(V N1 , X
N
1 |W11, ZN , V N2 , UN ) ≤ N
′′′
, (A79)
is guaranteed if Rr ≤ I(X1;Z|V1, V2, U) −  and Rr ≥ I(X1;Z|U, V2) −  ( → 0+), and this is from the
properties of AEP (similar argument is used in the proof of Theorem 3 in [18]). By using (A66) and (A67),
(A79) is obtained.
• For the case that L11 ≤ R11 ≤ L11 + L12, given UN , V N2 and W11, the total number of possible codewords
of V N1 is
N1 ≤ 2NL12 = 2NI(V1;Z|U,V2). (A80)
By using the Fano’s inequality and (A80), we have
H(V N1 |W11, ZN , V N2 , UN ) ≤ N
′′′
, (A81)
where 
′′′ → 0.
Given UN , V N1 , V
N
2 and W11, the total number of possible codewords of X
N
1 is
N2 ≤ 2NRr = 2N(min{I(X1;Y ),I(X1;Z|V1,V2,U)}−). (A82)
By using the Fano’s inequality and (A82), we have
H(XN1 |W11, ZN , V N1 , V N2 , UN ) ≤ N
′′′′
, (A83)
where 
′′′′ → 0.
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By using (A81) and (A83),
1
N
H(V N1 , X
N
1 |W11, ZN , V N2 , UN ) ≤ → 0, (A84)
is guaranteed.
• For the case that L11 + L12 ≤ R11 ≤ L11 + L12 + L3, given UN , V N2 and W11, V N1 is totally determined,
and therefore
H(V N1 |W11, ZN , V N2 , UN ) = 0. (A85)
Similarly, note that Rr = min{I(X1;Z|U, V1, V2), I(X1;Y )} − , by using the Fano’s inequality, we have
(A83). Thus
1
N
H(V N1 , X
N
1 |W11, ZN , V N2 , UN ) ≤ → 0 (A86)
is guaranteed.
Substituting (A75), (A76), (A77), (A78) and (A79) (or (A84), (A86)) into (A74), and using the definition
(2.3), we have limN→∞∆1 ≥ Re1 = min{I(X1;Z|U, V1, V2), I(X1;Y )} + I(V1;Y |U,X1) − I(V1;V2|U) −
I(X1, V1;Z|U, V2).
Proof of limN→∞∆2 ≥ Re2 = I(V2;Z|U)− I(V1;V2|U)− I(V2;Y |U,X1, V1):
H(W2|Y N ) ≥ H(W2|Y N , V N1 , UN , XN1 )
= H(W20,W22|Y N , V N1 , UN , XN1 )
(a)
= H(W22|Y N , V N1 , UN , XN1 )
= H(W22, Y
N |V N1 , UN , XN1 )−H(Y N |V N1 , UN , XN1 )
= H(W22, Y
N , V N2 |V N1 , UN , XN1 )−H(V N2 |W22, Y N , V N1 , UN , XN1 )−H(Y N |V N1 , UN , XN1 )
≥ H(Y N , V N2 |V N1 , UN , XN1 )−H(V N2 |W22, Y N , V N1 , UN , XN1 )−H(Y N |V N1 , UN , XN1 )
= H(V N2 |V N1 , UN , XN1 ) +H(Y N |V N2 , V N1 , UN , XN1 )−H(V N2 |W22, Y N , V N1 , UN , XN1 )
−H(Y N |V N1 , UN , XN1 )
(b)
= H(V N2 |UN )− I(V N1 ;V N2 |UN )− I(Y N ;V N2 |V N1 , UN , XN1 )
−H(V N2 |W22, Y N , V N1 , UN , XN1 ), (A87)
where (a) follows from the fact that given UN , W20 is uniquely determined, and (b) is from that XN1 is independent
of V N1 , V
N
2 and U
N .
For the first term in (A87), we have
H(V N2 |UN ) ≥ log 2N(L21+L22+L3) − δ3 = N(I(V2;Z|U)− )− δ3, (A88)
where δ3 is small for sufficiently large N .
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For the second and third terms in (A87), using the same approach as that in [3, Lemma 3], we get
I(V N1 ;V
N
2 |UN ) ≤ N(I(V1;V2|U) + 
′
), (A89)
and
I(Y N ;V N2 |V N1 , UN , XN1 ) ≤ N(I(V2;Y |U, V1, X1) + 
′′
), (A90)
where 
′
, 
′′ → 0 as N →∞.
Now, we consider the last term of (A87).
• For the case that R22 ≤ L21 + L22, given UN , V N1 and W22, the total number of possible codewords of V N2
is
N3 ≤ 2NL22 = 2NI(V2;Y |U,X1,V1). (A91)
By using the Fano’s inequality and (A91), we have
H(V N2 |W22, Y N , V N1 , UN , XN1 ) ≤ N
′′′
, (A92)
where 
′′′ → 0.
• For the case that L21 + L22 ≤ R22 ≤ L21 + L22 + L3, given UN , V N1 and W22, V N2 is totally determined,
and therefore
H(V N2 |W22, Y N , V N1 , UN , XN1 ) = 0. (A93)
Substituting (A88), (A89), (A90) and (A92) (or (A93)) into (A87), and using the definition (2.3), we have
limN→∞∆2 ≥ Re2 = I(V2;Z|U)− I(V1;V2|U)− I(V2;Y |U,X1, V1). This completes the proof for Theorem 3.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
The auxiliary random variables in R(Co) are defined by
Q , Y J−11 , U , (Y J−1,W0, ZNJ+1, J), V , (U,W1), Y , YJ , Z , ZJ ,
where J is a random variable (uniformly distributed over {1, 2, , ..., N}), and it is independent of XN , XN1 , Y N ,
Y N1 , Z
N , W0 and W1. From the above definitions, it is easy to see that the relay X1 is represented by the auxiliary
random variables Q. The common message W0 is represented by U , and the confidential message W1 is represented
by V . Now it remains to prove the inequalities of Theorem 4, see the followings.
Proof of R0 ≤ min{I(U,Q;Z), I(U ;Y1|Q)}:
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Note that
1
N
H(W0)
(1)
≤ 1
N
I(W0;Z
N ) +
δ()
N
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
I(W0;Zi|ZNi+1) +
δ()
N
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Zi)−H(Zi|ZNi+1,W0, Y i−1, Y i−11 )) +
δ()
N
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Zi|J = i)−H(Zi|ZNi+1,W0, Y i−1, Y i−11 , J = i)) +
δ()
N
= H(ZJ |J)−H(ZJ |ZNJ+1,W0, Y J−1, Y J−11 , J) +
δ()
N
(2)
≤ I(Q,U ;Z) + δ()
N
, (A94)
where (1) is from Fano’s inequality, and (2) is from the above definitions of U , Q and Z.
Also note that
1
N
H(W0)
(3)
≤ 1
N
I(W0;Y
N
1 , Z
N ) +
δ()
N
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
I(W0;Y1,i, Zi|Zi−1, Y i−11 ) +
δ()
N
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Y1,i, Zi|Y i−11 )−H(Y1,i, Zi|ZNi+1,W0, Y i−1, Zi−1, Y i−11 )) +
δ()
N
(4)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Y1,i, Zi|Y i−11 )−H(Y1,i, Zi|ZNi+1,W0, Y i−1, Y i−11 )) +
δ()
N
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Y1,i, Zi|Y i−11 , J = i)−H(Y1,i, Zi|ZNi+1,W0, Y i−1, Y i−11 , J = i)) +
δ()
N
≤ H(Y1,J , ZJ |Y J−11 )−H(Y1,J , ZJ |W0, Y J−1, ZNJ+1, Y J−11 , J) +
δ()
N
(5)
= I(U ;Y1, Z|Q) + δ()
N
(6)
= I(U ;Y1|Q) + δ()
N
, (A95)
where (3) is from Fano’s inequality, (4) is from the Markov chain (Y1,i, Zi) → (ZNi+1,W0, Y i−1, Y i−11 ) → Zi−1,
(5) is from the definitions of U , Q, Y1 and Z, and (6) is from the Markov chain U → (Q,Y1)→ Z.
Letting N →∞ and using limN→∞ 1NH(W0) = R0, R0 ≤ min{I(U,Q;Z), I(U ;Y1|Q)} is proved.
Proof of R0 +R1 ≤ min{I(Q,U, V ;Y ), I(U, V ;Y1|Q)}:
Similar to the proof of R0 ≤ min{I(U,Q;Z), I(U ;Y1|Q)}, first, note that
1
N
H(W0,W1)
(1)
≤ 1
N
I(W0,W1;Y
N ) +
δ()
N
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
I(W0,W1;Yi|Y i−1) + δ()
N
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi)−H(Yi|ZNi+1,W0,W1, Y i−1, Y i−11 )) +
δ()
N
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=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|J = i)−H(Yi|ZNi+1,W0,W1, Y i−1, Y i−11 , J = i)) +
δ()
N
= H(YJ |J)−H(YJ |ZNJ+1,W0,W1, Y J−1, Y J−11 , J) +
δ()
N
(2)
≤ I(Q,U, V ;Y ) + δ()
N
, (A96)
where (1) is from Fano’s inequality, and (2) is from the above definitions of U , V , Q and Y .
Also note that
1
N
H(W0,W1)
(3)
≤ 1
N
I(W0,W1;Y
N
1 , Y
N ) +
δ()
N
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
I(W0,W1;Y1,i, Yi|Y i−1, Y i−11 ) +
δ()
N
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Y1,i, Yi|Y i−11 )−H(Y1,i, Yi|ZNi+1,W0,W1, Y i−1, Y i−11 )) +
δ()
N
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Y1,i, Yi|Y i−11 , J = i)−H(Y1,i, Yi|ZNi+1,W0,W1, Y i−1, Y i−11 , J = i)) +
δ()
N
≤ H(Y1,J , YJ |Y J−11 )−H(Y1,J , YJ |W0,W1, Y J−1, ZNJ+1, Y J−11 , J) +
δ()
N
(4)
= I(U, V ;Y1, Y |Q) + δ()
N
(5)
= I(U, V ;Y1|Q) + δ()
N
, (A97)
where (3) is from Fano’s inequality, (4) is from the definitions of U , V , Q, Y1 and Y , and (5) is from the Markov
chain (U, V )→ (Q,Y1)→ Y .
Letting N →∞ and using limN→∞ 1NH(W0,W1) = R0 +R1, R0 +R1 ≤ min{I(Q,U, V ;Y ), I(U, V ;Y1|Q)}
is proved.
Proof of Re ≤ I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U):
Note that the definitions of U and V are the same as those of [3], and therefore, the proof of Re ≤ I(V ;Y |U)−
I(V ;Z|U) is the same as that of [3]. Thus, we omit the proof here.
Proof of Re ≤ I(V ;Y1|U,Q)− I(V ;Z|U,Q): First, note that
1
N
H(W1|ZN ) = 1
N
(H(W1|ZN ,W0) + I(W1;W0|ZN ))
(a)
≤ 1
N
H(W1|ZN ,W0) + δ()
N
=
1
N
(I(W1;Y
N , Y N1 |ZN ,W0) +H(W1|ZN ,W0, Y N , Y N1 )) +
δ()
N
(b)
≤ 1
N
I(W1;Y
N , Y N1 |ZN ,W0) +
2δ()
N
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(W1;Yi, Y1,i|Y i−1, Y i−11 , ZN ,W0)) +
2δ()
N
(c)
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi, Y1,i|Zi, ZNi+1,W0, Y i−1, Y i−11 )−H(Yi, Y1,i|Zi, ZNi+1,W0, Y i−1, Y i−11 ,W1)) +
2δ()
N
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=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi, Y1,i, Zi|ZNi+1,W0, Y i−1, Y i−11 )−H(Zi|ZNi+1,W0, Y i−1, Y i−11 )
−H(Yi, Y1,i, Zi|ZNi+1,W0, Y i−1, Y i−11 ,W1) +H(Zi|ZNi+1,W0, Y i−1, Y i−11 ,W1)) +
2δ()
N
(d)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(Vi;Yi, Y1,i, Zi|Ui, Qi)− I(Vi;Zi|Ui, Qi)) + 2δ()
N
(e)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(Vi;Y1,i|Ui, Qi)− I(Vi;Zi|Ui, Qi)) + 2δ()
N
(f)
≤ I(V ;Y1|U,Q)− I(V ;Z|U,Q) + 2δ()
N
, (A98)
where (a) and (b) are from Fano’s inequality, (c) is from the Markov chain (Yi, Y1,i)→ (Zi, ZNi+1,W0, Y i−1, Y i−11 ,W1)→
Zi−1, (d) is from the definitions Qi = Y i−11 , Ui = (Y
i−1,W0, ZNi+1), Vi = (Ui,W1), (e) is from the fact that given
Qi, Ui, Yi, Zi and Y1,i, Vi is independent of X1,i, and the Markov chains Vi → (X1,i, Ui, Qi, Y1,i) → Yi → Zi,
Vi → (Ui, Qi) → X1,i and Vi → (Ui, Qi, Y1,i) → X1,i, and (f) is from the above definitions of U , Q, V , Y1 and
Z, and note that J is a time sharing random variable. Letting N → ∞ and using limN→∞ 1NH(W1|ZN ) ≥ Re,
Re ≤ I(V ;Y1|U,Q)− I(V ;Z|U,Q) is proved.
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